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ARTICLES
THE FUTURE OF LICENSING MUSIC
ONLINE: THE ROLE OF COLLECTIVE
RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
EFFECT OF TERRITORIALITY
NEIL CONLEYt

I.

INTRODUCTION

The right to control the performance of a creative work' represents
for most songwriters and music publishers ("rights holders")2 their greatest source of income. 3 However, the current licensing regime practiced
t The author will receive his LL.M. in intellectual property law at the George Washington University Law School in August of 2008. I would like to thank Ralph Oman, my
professor, for his guidance, suggestions, and edits. I would also like to give many thanks to
Marvin Berenson of BMI, Mike Huppe and Ryan Lehning of SoundExchange, Lee Knife of
DiMA, and Bruce Lehman for taking so much time out of their busy schedules to answer
my many questions. I would also like to thank Sam Mosenkis of ASCAP for his help in
answering some questions. In addition, I would like to thank Jean Banks of BMI and
Lynne Enman of ASCAP for answering some questions about their respective organization's licensing practices. I would also like to send many thanks to Tilman Liider, Head of
the E.U. Commission's Copyright Unit, Tobias McKenney of the E.U. Commission's DG of
Internal Market and Services, and Main Andries of the E.U. Commission's DG of Competition for taking the time to answer questions that I sent them via emails. I would also like
to thank Erik Verzijl of BUMA for taking the time to answer some questions via email.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their continued support.
1. See Part II for a discussion of the performance right.
2. Throughout this paper the term "rights holders" is used to describe the individuals
or entities that own the copyright in a musical composition. For example, such people include songwriters or music publishers, those individuals or entities that own the copyright
in sound recordings, performers or record labels. Part II.A., infra, will discuss how a copyright in a song entails numerous exclusive rights that can be either licensed or assigned.
"Rights holders," more broadly stated, refers to the individuals or entities that own some or
all of these exclusive rights.
3.

DONALD

E.

BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUS-

TRIES 667 (5th ed. 2007).
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by collective rights organizations ("CROs") 4 for online music is preventing rights holders from being able to reap the financial benefits that the
Internet 5 and digital transmissions of music can provide. The problem is
that CROs license online music on a restrictive, national basis, where
the online transmission of music is worldwide and unrestricted by national boundaries. Licenses to transmit music online are restricted on a
national basis because of agreements entered into between the CROs
and the rights holders that require the rights holders to grant licenses
only on a national basis. These territorially restrictive agreements have
no place in the licensing of online music where digital transmissions are
not limited by national boundaries. The present licensing system is inef6
ficient, costly, and hinders the development of online music providers'
ability to distribute music to consumers. Ultimately, this system prevents rights holders from realizing the full financial benefit the Internet
offers. 7 This paper will discuss why the present system of territorially
restrictive licensing for online music is unnecessary and why the CROs,
if not of their own accord, then at the behest of rights holders, should
replace this territorially restrictive regime with a multiterritorial licensing regime.
Part II of this paper will provide an overview of the legal basis, in
the United States, for the right of public performance. Part III will provide a brief history of the public performance right in the United States.
Part IV will explore the different relationships in the music industry
4. The term "collective rights organizations" refers to the organizations that license
one or a few of the exclusive rights for many rights holders who have allowed the CROs the
ability to do so.
5. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 156 (Columbia Law Review
Ass'n et. Al. eds., 18th ed. 2005) (using Internet to describe citations of online sources); see
also Wikipedia.org, Internet Capitalization Conventions, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet capitalization-conventions (last visited May 1, 2008). However, there is a push to
start spelling Internet with a lower-case I. See Wikipedia Internet Convention, supra note
5. Some publications started to use the word internet with a lower-case "I" See Tony Long,
It's Just the "internet"Now, Wired.com, http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/news/2004/
08/64596 (last visited May 1, 2008).
6. "Online music providers" are any service that provides music on the Internet, including, webcasters, simulcasters, online Internet radio stations, and online download services. See E.U. Commission Staff Working Document: Study on a Community Initiative on
the Cross-border Collective Management of Copyright (July 7, 2005), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/internal-market/copyright/docs/management/study-collectivemgmt-en.pdf
(using the term "'online music provider" in the same way it is used in this Article).
7. See Tilman Ltider, The Next Ten Years in E. U. Copyright: Making Markets Work,
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 18-19 (2007), available at, http://
law.fordham.edu/publications/articles/200flspub9536.pdf (stating that online retailers see
territorially restrictive license as an impediment to the roll-out of new cross-border online
services); Assessment, infra note 207, at 6 (stating that rights holders feel that the territorially restrictive licensing regime deprives them of online revenue).
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8
that involve the public performance right. Part V will look at how U.S.
performance right organizations 9 administer licenses on an international level. Part VI will look at types of digital transmissions and
whether they constitute a public performance. Part VII will make a brief
comparison of the performance right and CROs in the United States and
Europe. Part VIII will explore multiterritorial licensing of music on the
Internet, discussing the effect of territoriality on copyright law generally
and will specifically discuss the problems of the present territorially restrictive licensing regime that a multiterritorial license would solve.
Part VIII will also discuss other problems, independent of the present
licensing system, that a multiterritorial licensing regime would solve.
Part IX will look at possible solutions to territorially restrictive licensing
of online music. Part X will discuss the future of multiterritorial licensing of online music. Finally, Part XI will conclude that the current licensing regime consisting of licensing music on a territorially restrictive
basis is inefficient and unjustified in the online environment. This paper
will suggest the elements that a multiterritorial licensing regime should
have and the steps that CROs and rights holders need to take in order to
fully realize the potential of the Internet and digital transmissions in
general.

II.
A.

PERFORMANCE RIGHTS

THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT
IN THE UNITED STATES

When one hears a sound recording of a song or a musical composition, one is hearing two copyrighted works. One work is the underlying
musical composition, consisting of the actual words and musical notes.
The author of the musical composition is the songwriter. The copyright
owner ("rights holder") 10 of a musical composition is usually the song8. "United States" may be abbreviated to "U.S." if used as an adjective. See THE
6.1(b) (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al.
eds., 18th ed. 2005).
9. Most other CROs outside the United States, for example many in the European
Union, administer more than just the public performance right and those will be referred to
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 72,

as CROs. CROs that only administer a license for the performance right, such as BMI and
ASCAP, are often referred to as performance right organizations ("PROs"). However, this

Article will refer to BMI and ASCAP as CROs for the sake of continuity, and to minimize
the number of acronyms used.
10. For the sake of consistency, "rights holders" will refer to those individuals or entities who own the copyright in either the musical composition or the sound recording, or
both. A copyright either in the musical composition or in the sound recording of the composition gives the rights holder or copyright holder, various "exclusive rights" that can be
fragmented or licensed to other entities. A rights holder may license an exclusive right
without restrictions or with restrictions as to the duration, geography, or scope. For example, a music publisher in country A, who is the rights holder in a repertoire of songs, may
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writer or a music publisher to whom the songwriter has assigned their
rights in the composition. The rights holder in a musical composition
usually has the full right of public performance, in addition to other
rights." The other copyrighted work is in the sound recording, i.e. musical performance, of the underlying musical composition. The authors of
the sound recording are the performers 12 and producers who created the
performance of the musical composition. The rights holder of a sound
recording is usually the record company that commissioned the work.13
Rights holders in a sound recording enjoy only a limited right of public
performance. 14 Below is the statutory language granting the performance right in the United States to the rights holders of musical compositions and sound recordings.
1. The Public Performance Right in the Musical Composition
According to the United States Copyright Act, to perform music
means to "recite, render, [or] play ... it, either directly or by means of a
device or process. ' 15 The right of performance is the exclusive right to
perform, or authorize to perform, a work publicly, whether for profit or
not. 16 The act of publicly performing music means:
(1) to perform.., it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and
its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance... of the work
to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device
or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the
place or in separate places and at the same
performance ...in the same
17
time or at different times.
license the public performance right of the repertoire to a publisher in country B. This
allows the publisher in country B to license the public performance of the repertoire in
country B.
11. The rights holder of a musical composition enjoys the exclusive rights of reproduction, creation of derivative works, distribution, public performance, and public display of
the musical composition. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2007). These exclusive rights are subject to
statutory exceptions. See id. at §§ 107-112.
12. Performers (sometimes referred to as artists), for purposes of this Article, will include vocalists and musicians.
13. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON Music LICENSING 1312 (3d ed. 2002).
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (granting rights holders in sound recordings the exclusive
right to publicly perform their works only if the works are transmitted via digital audio
transmissions).
15. Id. § 101.
16. Id. § 106(4).
17. Id. § 101.
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The Public PerformanceRight in the Sound Recording

Congress has granted rights holders of a sound recording the right to
authorize the public performance of the recording for certain digital audio transmissions. 1 8 However, this right is limited. 19 For example, if
the transmission is a non-subscription, non-interactive transmission or
the retransmission of a non-subscription terrestrial broadcast, then the
transmission is exempt from acquiring a license for the public performance of the sound recording. 20 However, if the transmission is interactive, then the service providing the transmission is required to obtain a
license for the public performance of the sound recording from the rights
holders of the sound recording, i.e. the record company. 2 1 Part V of this
Article will further discuss the differences between interactive, non-interactive, and subscription services.
Recently introduced legislation, if passed, will grant owners of sound
recordings a full performance right. On December 18, 2007, a bill called
the "Performance Right Act" was introduced in the House. Currently,
section 106(6) of the U.S. Copyright Act reads, "in the case of a sound
recording, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital
audio transmission."2 2 The bill would amend section 106(6) of the U.S.
Copyright Act to read "in the case of sound recordings, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of an audio transmission."2 3 The
bill would also amend section 114(d)(1) by striking "by means of a digital
audio transmission" and replacing it with "by means of an audio transmission. '2 4 In essence, the bill eliminates the distinction between digital
and terrestrial transmissions and gives rights holders a full performance
right for sound recordings. For the music publishers and songwriters,
section 5 of the bill is the most important. Entitled "No Harmful Effects
on Songwriters," section 5 explicitly states, "[n]othing in this act shall
adversely affect in any respect the public performance rights of or royal'2 5
ties payable to songwriters or rights holders of musical works.
This legislation is not without controversy, however. This bill rekindles a long-standing dispute over whether to grant sound recordings a
18. Id. § 101(6).
19. Id. § 114(d).
20. See17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1) and (2) (2007).
21. Id. § 114(f).
22. Id. § 106.
23. Performance Right Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 4789, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hllO-4789. On January 14, 2008, the
bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on courts, the Internet, and intellectual property. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dllO:HR04789:@@@X, (last visited Apr.
16, 2008) (describing the status of the bill).
24. Performance Act, supra note 23, at Section 2(b).
25. Id. at Section 5.
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full performance right. The same parties have taken their familiar
stances in regards to this bill. The rights holders of sound recordings,
which are predominantly record companies, obviously support the legislation. The U.S. CROs are uneasy, worrying that they and their members, which are the music publishers and the songwriters, will lose
royalties to the owners of sound recordings. 26 The broadcasters also do
not want the bill to pass because they are already paying royalties to the
songwriters and publishers for the public performance of the underlying
musical composition and do not want to pay royalties to the owners of
sound recordings, too. In an attempt to kill the Performance Right Act,
the broadcasters filed a resolution with Congress, expressing their view
that Congress should not grant sound recordings a full performance
27
right.
B.

HISTORY OF THE PERFORMANCE RIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE SUBSEQUENT CREATION OF THE PERFORMANCE

RIGHT ORGANIZATIONS

As noted above, a song contains two copyrights. If a person or entity
wants to play, i.e. perform, a song publicly, they must obtain a license
from the rights holder of the musical composition, and in some instances
for the sound recording. 28 With the granting of the right of public performance to the rights holders of musical compositions came the need for
performance right organizations to administer the performance right on
behalf of the rights holders. Songwriters and composers needed a way to
enforce their right of public performance of their musical compositions.
Most, if not all, did not have the resources to police every theatre, bar,
restaurant, hotel, etc. to make sure the proprietors of those establishments had a license to play their music. In addition, it was not practical,
and likely impossible, for the owners of these establishments to obtain a
license from each rights holder of each musical composition that was
played in their establishments. Therefore, rights holders needed CROs
26. See ASCAP: Legislation, http://www.ascap.com/legislation/history/performingrights-act244.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
27. Supporting the Local Radio Freedom Act, H.R. Res. 244, 110th Congress (2007),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hc110-244. This Resolution
points out Congress' long history of denying terrestrial performance rights to sound recordings. Id. In addition, the resolution claims that allowing record companies to collect performance royalties on sound recordings would cause economic hardships for small radio
stations, bars, and restaurants. Id.
28. This is only one right for which a music provider or user of music must obtain a
license. A terrestrial radio station for example, would only be required to obtain a license
for the public performance of the musical composition. A webcaster, however, must obtain
a public performance license for the musical composition and for the sound recording. Music providers who provide download services are required to obtain a mechanical license for
the reproduction and distribution of both the musical composition and the sound recording.
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for efficiency and practicality reasons. CROs, under authorization of
their member songwriters and publishers, granted blanket licenses to
users of songs, i.e. radio stations, restaurants, hotels, etc., policed users
to make sure the users had a license for songs they were playing, collected royalties from users, and distributed these royalties to their member songwriters and publishers.
1.

The History of the PerformanceRight in Musical Compositions in
the United States and the Creation of ASCAP and BMI

The 1897 revision of the U.S. Copyright Act established, for the first
time, a songwriter's exclusive right of public performance. 2 9 However,
rights holders did not initially enforce this new right. 30 Many songwriters and composers felt that the public performance of their songs was the
best method of advertisement for sheet music of their compositions,
which, at the time, was their major source of income. 3 1 The 1909 revision of the U.S. Copyright Act provided that a license for the public performance of a copyrighted song was only required if the performance was
rendered "publicly for profit."3 2 The initial interpretation of the 1909 revision was that a license was required only if there was an admission fee
charged to hear the performance. 3 3 This limitation, of course, exempted
restaurants, hotels, bars, and other places whose primary business was
not in charging patrons to hear the music played, but that just played
music in the background. 3 4 However, in 1914, during dinner at The
Lambs in New York City, a group of songwriters, including Irving Berlin
and John Philip Sousa, listened to fellow songwriter Victor Herbert's
frustration at having heard one of the songs he had written played at a
nearby expensive restaurant. 3 5 Herbert expressed his frustration to the
group that the restaurant could play his song without compensating
36
him.
To remedy this problem, in 1914, this group of songwriters formed a
performance right society, the first CRO in the United States, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP"). 3 7 Three
29. KOHN, supra note 13, at 904.

30. MAKEEM FOUAD MAKEEM, COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY: THE
SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL, U.S., U.K. AND FRENCH LAW 19
(2000).
31. MAKEEM, supra note 30, at 19.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 1(d) (2007); KOHN, supra note 13, at 904.
33. KOHN, supra note 13, at 904.

34. Id. at 904-05.
35. Id. at 904.
36. Id.
37. Id. There must be something about hearing one's song played in a restaurant that
fills a composer or songwriter with the desire to form a CRO. In 1847, in France, the
French composer Alexandre Bourget, along with Victor Parizot, and Paul Hernion went to
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years later, in 1917, the group took a case to the Supreme Court, which
changed how "publicly for profit" was to be interpreted. 38 The case involved a suit by ASCAP against a New York restaurant for an unauthorized public performance of the ASCAP musical composition,
"Sweetheart," by Victor Herbert. 3 9 Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
held that when the service in question is offered for profit, such as a
restaurant, then the playing of a song by the service provider constitutes
a public performance. 4 0 This case opened the door to public performance
licensing. ASCAP proceeded to license any establishment or service that
41
operated for a profit and played music.

In 1923, the District Court of New Jersey handed down another
landmark decision for performance rights, holding that songs played
during radio broadcasts were played for profit and required a license
from the rights holder of the song. 4 2 In 1944, a court held that the
broadcasting of copyrighted music by non-commercial stations was also a
public performance. 4 3 In 1926, the advent of coast-to-coast radio networks created an incredible source of revenue for songwriters.4 4 However, negotiations between radio broadcasters and ASCAP regarding
45
licensing rates became more and more difficult as the years passed.
Due to the difficulties in negotiations with ASCAP, in 1940, a group
of broadcasters, consisting of major radio networks and almost 500 inde"Les Ambassadeur caff' in the Champs-t lysees in Paris. MAKEEM, supra note 30, at 14.
While at the caf6, Bourget heard one of his musical works being performed. Id. Bourget,
angry that the proprietor of the restaurant had not paid Bourget for the public
performanceof his song, refused to pay for his drinks. Id. Bourget filed suit against the
owner of the caf6 and, in 1847, the court awarded Bourget an injunction against the owner
for having others perform Bourget's songs. Id. at 15. The court broadened the scope of a
1791 decree that was originally passed to break the monopoly of the Comddie Francaise
over theatres. Id. The 1791 decree provided French authors of dramatic works the exclusive right to perform their works in public theatre, which the Comddie Fran~aise had historically controlled. Id. at 14. On the heels of his success, Bourget and others established
the Societ6 des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique ("SACEM"), which is the
French performance right CRO. Id. at 19.
38. KOHN, supra note 13, at 905. Note that the present law grants rights holders in a
song the right of public performance whether the performance is for profit or not. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(4) (2007).
39. KOHN, supra note 13, at 905.
40. Id. (citing Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U.S. 591 (1917)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 905-06 (citing Whitmark & Sons v. Bamberger and Co., 291 F. 776 (D. N.J.
1923)).
43. MAKEEM, supra note 30, at 40 (citing Associated Music Publishers v. Deb Mem'l
Radio Fund, 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1944)).
44. KOHN, supra note 13, at 905.
45. Id.
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pendent radio stations, formed Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"). 4 6 Paul
Heineke, a European music publisher, established the third CRO in the
United States, SESAC, in 1931. 4 7 Today, ASCAP and BMI represent the
majority of songwriters and publishers, with SESAC licensing only about
48
1% of all performance rights in the United States.
2.

The History of Protection of Sound Recordings in the United States
49
and the Creation of SoundExchange

Sound recordings first received protection under the U.S. Copyright
Act on February 15, 1972, when a law enacted in 1971 became effective,
giving exclusive federal rights of reproduction and distribution to rights
holders of sound recordings. 50 However, rights holders of sound recordings were not granted a public performance right. This meant that users
such as radio and television stations, bars, etc. who performed sound recordings publicly, were not obligated to obtain a license to do so from the
record companies. The reason that the rights holders of sound recordings were not granted a public performance right was, and continues to
be (at least in regards to a full performance right), the strong opposition
from the broadcasting industry, jukebox operators, and wired music services. 5 1 These groups already pay royalties to songwriters and publishers for the right to perform the musical compositions publicly in a song;
they also do not want to pay record companies for the right to perform
46. Id. at 906. BMI claims it was formed by "radio executives to provide competition in
the field of performing rights
. " See BMI.com, Tradition, http://www.bmi.com/about/
entry/C1508 (last visited Apr. 16, 2008). However, the formation of BMI likely hurt the
very entities who formed BMI, i.e. the radio stations. Interview with Bruce Lehman, Senior Counsel at Akin Gump in Washington D.C. and former Secretary of Commerce and
Commissioner of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (Apr. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Lehman Interview]. Once formed, BMI had to compete with ASCAP for members, i.e.
songwriters and publishers. Id. In order to get members, BMI had to offer songwriters and
publishers greater royalties. Id. To obtain greater royalties, BMI had to charge users,
such as radio stations, more money. Id.
47. KOHN, supra note 13, at 907. The SESAC website, however, states that SESAC
was founded in 1930. See Sesac.com, http://www.sesac.com/aboutsesac/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 24, 2008). SESAC originally formed to license European music and gospel music.
Id. However, its repertoire now spans many genres. Id.
48. DONALD S. PAsSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNow ABOUT THE Music BUSINEss 225 (6th
ed. 2006).
49. SoundExchange is always spelled as one word. Email from Ryan Lehning, Senior
Counsel at SoundExchange (June 19, 2008, 11:44 EST) (on file with author).
50. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971); David 0.
Carson, Statement Made to General Counsel, U.S. Copyright Office, Before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 108th Congress 4 (July 15, 2004), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/
carson071504.pdf.
51. Carson, supra note 50, at 4.
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sound recordings publicly. 52 In addition, songwriters, music publishers
and the CROs who license the performance right of these rights holders'
musical compositions fear that if rights holders of sound recordings are
given a public performance right, then the royalties paid to the songwriters and publishers for their right of public performance would decrease. 5 3 Of course, the record companies, represented by the Recording
Industry Association of America, and performers and artists, represented by the American Federation of Musicians, believe entities that
profit from the public performances of sound recording should compen54
sate record companies, i.e. the rights holders of sound recordings.
The development of digital technology and the Internet created serious issues for performers and the record companies because, unlike a
terrestrial broadcast, a digital transmission of a song over the Internet
provides the listener with an exact copy of the song with no degradation
in sound quality. Therefore, online services, specifically interactive services that allow consumers to download music or that allow consumers to
control what songs they hear and when they hear them, were seen as
threats to CD sales. 5 5 In 1995, the Digital Performance Right in Sound
Recording Act ("DPRA") granted rights holders of sound recordings the
exclusive right, subject to certain limitations, to perform their works
publicly by means of digital audio transmissions. 5 6 The DPRA added
paragraph (6) to section 106 of the U.S. Copyright Act, giving the owner
of a sound recording "the exclusive right to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission." 5 7 However, the right
was limited to interactive and non-subscription services. 58 Non-interac59
tive, non-subscription online transmissions, therefore, were exempt.
Interactive services were required to obtain a license directly from the
rights holders, the record companies. Certain subscription services were
subject to a compulsory license, provided certain restrictions were in
60
place.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.

55. Id. at 8.
56. Digital Performance in Sound Recording Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.

104-39, 336 Stat.
109 (1995), available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/pll04-39.html.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2007).
58. Carson, supra note 50, at 9. The belief was that such services were not a threat to
traditional CD sales. Id. See Part V.A. for a description of interactive, non-interactive,
subscription, and nonsubscription services.
59. Carson, supra note 50, at 9.
60. Id. This was done to allow these services to avoid the difficulties in direct licensing
and focus more on developing new business models to benefit consumers. Id. The restrictions included a prohibition on announcing songs in advance of playing the songs and playing too many songs from the same artist or same album in a given period. Id.; 17 U.S.C.
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The DPRA, however, soon proved out-of-date and inadequate in light
of the incredibly fast pace that technology and Internet services were
advancing. 6 ' The main threat came from non-interactive, nonsubscription webcasting, which offers various formats of music to anyone with an
Internet connection. 62 Among some of the webcasting formats that
posed a problem were those that played songs from only one artist
twenty-four hours every day or adjusted, in various ways, the songs
heard by any given listener, based upon that listener's past listening
preferences. 6 3 Therefore, in 1998, Congress again revised section 114 of
the U.S. Copyright Act to protect the record industry from these new
non-interactive, nonsubscription services by passing the Digital Millen64
nium Copyright Act ("DMCA").
The licensing regime in the United States for the public performance
of sound recordings is as follows. 6 5 First, there is no public performance
right for the terrestrial transmission of sound recordings. Second, noninteractive digital audio transmissions are exempt only if they fall into
one of three categories: a) the transmission is part of a nonsubscription
broadcast (i.e. traditional terrestrial broadcast) transmission; 6 6 b) the
transmission is a retransmission of a nonsubscription broadcast transmission (provided certain requirements are met);6 7 or c) the transmission falls within a certain category. 68 Second, digital audio
transmissions not exempt in section 114(d)(1), eligible nonsubscription
transmissions, and certain pre-existing satellite radio services are subject to a statutory license (administered by SoundExchange 69 ) for the
right to publicly perform sound recordings.7 0 Third, there are interactive music services, which must negotiate a license directly with the
§ 114(d)(2)(B)(i) (2007) (requiring one to go to section 114(j)(13) to find the definition of
"sound recording performance complement," which lists all of the limitations that a nonexempt subscription transmission service must have to be eligible for a statutory license for
the public performance of sound recordings by digital means).
61. Carson, supra note 50, at 9-10.
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The following is a generalized overview. Section 114 has a myriad of exceptions to
the public performance right of sound recordings, which are beyond the scope of this
Article.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A) (2007).
67. Id. § 114(d)(1)(B).
68. Id. § 114(d)(1)(C).
69. See note 75, infra, and accompanying text for a description of SoundExchange.
70. These are noninteractive services that are not exempt under section 114(d)(1). Id.
§ 114(j)(6). This means, basically, any noninteractive, nonsubscription service that is not
part of, or a retransmission of, a non-subscription broadcast, such as a terrestrial radio
transmission.
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rights holder of the sound recording, the record label. 7 1 Therefore, section 114 creates a public performance right for sound recordings transmitted digitally, if the transmissions are not part of a terrestrial
broadcast or a retransmission of such a broadcast. In addition, the
DMCA creates a statutory license for ephemeral copies, which
SoundExchange also licenses. 72 Finally, interactive services are obli73
gated to obtain a license directly from the record companies.
Although, the DPRA and DMCA finally granted the rights holders of
sound recordings, i.e. the record companies, certain rights of public performance for their sound recordings in the realm of digital transmissions, a full performance right, such as for any public performance,
digital or terrestrial, is still lacking. Many feel that there is no reason
for music publishers and songwriters to enjoy a full performance right
while performers and record companies do not. 74 The U.S. Copyright Office has repeatedly urged that sound recordings receive a full performance right, especially considering that sound recordings are the only
75
copyrighted work that does not receive a full performance right.
The U.S. Copyright Office designated SoundExchange to administer
statutory licenses for certain non-interactive digital transmissions of
71. Id. §114(d)(3). In addition, the DMCA now requires users transmitting songs over
the Internet
[T]o cooperate with rights holders to prevent recipients from using software or
devices that scan transmissions for particular sound recordings or artists; to allow
for the transmission of copyright protection measures that are widely used to identify or protect copyrighted works; and to disable copying by a recipient in the case
where the transmitting entity possesses the technology to do so, as well as taking
care not to induce or encourage copying by the recipient.
Carson, supra note 50, at 11 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§114(d)(2)(C)(v)-(viii)-(ii) (2007)). The words
"record label" and "record company" refer to the same entity, i.e. a company that contracts
performers to create a sound recording to which the company then owns the rights. The
company then puts the recording on CDs, promotes the CDs and distributes the CDs. In
addition, the company licenses users, such as iTunes, to offer the sound recordings as
downloads for which the record company gets a percentage of the profits.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 112(e) (2007). During the course of a digital transmission, one or more
ephemeral, or temporary, copies are made as buffers in the random access memory

("RAM") of computers to facilitate the transmission.
BURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND MATERIALS

ROBERT

A.

GORMAN & JANE

C. GINS-

345 (7th ed. 2006). The Copyright Royalty Board

determines the rates for both statutory licenses under sections 114 and 112. See
Soundexchange.com, About and Background, http://www.soundexchange.com/ (last visited
Apr. 24, 2008).
73. It seems that most record companies, however, have been reluctant to grant interactive services licenses or, if they have, it has been on a limited basis, which has severely
hurt interactive webcasting. Matthew J. Astle, Will Congress Kill the PodcastingStar?, 19
HARv. J. L. & TECH. 161, 179 (2005) (citing WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP:
TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 105 (2004)).
74. Carson, supra note 50, at 13.
75. Id. (citing Report of the Register of Copyright, Copyright Implications of Digital
Audio Transmission Services (October 1991)).
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songs, pursuant to sections 112 and 114(f) of the U.S. Copyright Act. 7 6
SoundExchange is a non-profit organization that was established by the
Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA"). 77 In 2003,
SoundExchange spun off from the RIAA and now operates independently. 78 SoundExchange collects royalties for its members, for nonmembers, and for its corresponding CROs in other countries with which
79
it has reciprocal agreements.
III.

IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIPS IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS
AFFECTING THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT

The songwriters and composers of music are the fountainheads of
the music industry. Through their gift of creativity, they put together
words and melodies to create the musical compositions that become a
part of our lives and a part of the international zeitgeist. It is, of course,
their creations, their songs, that drive the music industry. The music
industry has built itself around the reproduction, distribution, and performance of their songs. In order to fully understand the scope of the
dispute, it is necessary to examine briefly the relationships in the music
industry that facilitate the dissemination of performances of songs from
the pen of the single songwriter to the masses.
A.

SONGWRITERS AND

Music

PUBLISHERS

The songwriter often enters into an agreement, called the "songwriter agreement," with a music publisher.8 0 The songwriter agreement
sets out the share of the publishing income, i.e. the share of royalties
that the songwriter and publisher will each receive.8 1 The publisher and
songwriter usually split the royalties 50/50.82 In addition, the writer
will usually assign to the publisher the rights to his or her songs.8 3 The
publisher then has administrative rights, which include the right to promote the songs by getting record companies to create commercial recordings, finding users, issuing licenses to users, collecting monies from
76. Id.; 17 U.S.C. §§ 112 and 114(f) (2007). SoundExchange also administers licenses
to digital cable and satellite television services and satellite radio services.
Soundexchange.com, FAQ, http://www.soundexchange.com/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
77. See Soundexchange.com, http://www.soundexchange.com/ (last visited Apr. 16,

2008).
78. Lehning Email, supra note 49.
79. Email from Ryan Lehning, Senior Counsel for SoundExchange (Apr. 14, 2008)(on

file with author) [hereinafter Lehning Email 4/14/08]. See Part IV.A. for further explanation of SoundExchange's relationship with foreign CROs.
80.
81.
82.
83.

KOHN, supra note 13, at 107.
Id.
PASSMAN, supra note 48, at 207.
Id.
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these licensees, and paying the writers their share of the royalties.8 4 Ansuccessful writers are increasyone may be a music publisher. 8 5 In 8fact,
6
ingly acting as their own publishers.
B.

SONGWRITERS, PUBLISHERS, AND COLLECTIVE RIGHTS
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Music publishers in the United States affiliate themselves with one
of the three performance right CROs in the United States. 7 The music
publisher, through an agreement, grants to the CRO the right to license
all of the songs controlled by the music publisher.88 A CRO's repertoire
is the CRO's entire collection of songs from the thousands of songwriters
and music publishers that have entered into agreements with the CRO.
The CROs then license the public performance right in its repertoire of
songs, usually through blanket licenses, which cover the CROs' entire
repertoire. CROs grant blanket licenses to users, such as radio stations
89
and bars, who then have the right to perform the songs publicly.
Therefore, when a user in the United States, such as a radio station,
requires a license to publicly perform music, the user goes to a CRO,
such as BMI, and pays an annual fee for a blanket license to publicly
perform an unlimited number of times any or all of the millions of songs
in BMI's repertoire. 90 The CROs then collect the royalties from these
84. Id.
85. M.

WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF

Music 222 (9th ed.

2003).
86. Id.
87. PASSMAN, supra note 48, at 225. Technically the three CROs in the United States
are called performance right organizations ("PROs") because these organizations only li-

cense the performance right. However, as previously stated, this Article will use the term
CRO to refer to the U.S. PROs to create some continuity and to reduce the number of different acronyms used.
88. Id. The assignment to ASCAP or BMI, however, is a nonexclusive license, in accor-

dance with court ordered consent decrees governing ASCAP and BMI's licensing practices.
KOHN, supra note 13, at 916-17. The consent decrees were a result of antitrust litigation.
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 322-24 (Daniel Gervais ed.
2006) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT]; see also note 95, infra (providing more information on the consent decrees). This means that songwriters and music publishers may

also negotiate nonexclusive licenses directly with users, such as television and radio stations. KOHN, supra note 13, at 919. Therefore, although it rarely occurs because blanket
licenses from CROs are usually more convenient and economical, members of these CROs

may negotiate directly with users to license the rights to the members' songs. Id. at 919-20.
89. PASSMAN, supra note 48, at 225. If a user feels the fee charged by BMI or ASCAP is
unfair then, according to either of the consent decrees that govern both CROs, the user may
apply for a ruling on the fairness of the fee by a federal court. KOHN, supra note 13, at 918-

19.
90. KOHN, supra note 13, at 918. The annual license fee depends on the type and size
of the business requiring the license. Id. In 1998, the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act"
was passed exempting food, drinking, and retail establishments from requiring a license to
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licenses and, according to very complicated calculations, 9 1 determine the
frequency with which each song was played.9 2 Then, based on these calculations, the CROs distribute to their member publishers and songwriters the royalties that the CRO has calculated were generated by the
songwriters' songs, giving the publisher's share directly to the publisher
and the songwriter's share directly to the songwriter. 9 3 The U.S. CROs
distribute royalties to writers and publishers on a 50/50 basis. 9 4 Song-

writers, acting as their own publisher, may sign directly with one of the
95
three CROs in the United States.

C.

PERFORMERS, RECORD LABELS, AND SOUNDEXCHANGE

In addition to licenses for the public performance of a musical composition, there are mechanical licenses, which cover the reproduction and
distribution rights of songwriters 9 6 and music publishers. A music publisher will enter into an agreement with an agency, usually the Harry

Fox Agency, which allows Harry Fox to grant statutory mechanical licenses pursuant to section 115 of the U.S. Copyright Act to record companies. 9 7 The mechanical license grants to record companies the right to
reproduce and distribute songs on a tangible medium, which today is
predominantly CDs. 98 Harry Fox then collects mechanical royalties
from the record companies, takes a percentage for its own services, and

distributes the rest to the publishers who will then give the writers their
play songs in their establishments if certain criteria were met in regards to size of the
establishment and the number and size of speakers and audiovisual equipment used. Id.
at 919; see Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 110, available at, http:/l
www.copyright.gov/legislation/s505.pdf.
91. KOHN, supra note 13, at 924.
92. Id.; see ASCAP.com, About ASCAP: Royalty Calculation, http://www.ascap.com/
about/payment/royalties.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2008) (describing how ASCAP generally
calculates royalties).
93. ASCAP.com, How You Get Paid at ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about/payment/
paymentintro.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
94. KOHN, supra note 13, at 317.
95. KA SOVSKY, supra note 85, at 222. BMI and ASCAP are required, pursuant to
court-ordered consent decrees aimed at limiting their monopoly on the licensing of musical
rights, to encourage people to become publishers. Id. The first consent decree was entered
into in 1941 and has been modified several times since. See Justice Department Agreement to Modify ASCAP Consent Decree, Sept. 5, 2000, available at, http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/press releases/2000/6404.htm.
96. When the author mentions songwriters as being the rights holders in a musical
composition, the author is referring to songwriters who did not assign the rights in their
songs to a music publisher.
97. KOHN, supra note 13, at 223.
98. PASsMAN, supra note 48, at 213; see also Harry Fox Agency, Licensing Through
HFA, http://www.harryfox.com/public/licenseHome.jsp (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
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share. 9 9 In 1995, the DPRA made the compulsory mechanical license
apply to digital phonorecord deliveries, i.e. permanent downloads of mu-

sic files.' 0 0 Therefore, the Harry Fox Agency now licenses digital phono1° 1
gram deliveries, which are downloads of music from the Internet.
Before the record companies begin manufacturing CDs, records, or
10 2
Record
cassettes; however, they need to create a sound recording.
recordings
sound
to
create
producers
and
performers
companies will sign

of songs, under contract with the record company. The relationship between the artist and the record company is usually one of employer and
employee. The record company, being the employer, becomes the sole
owner of the sound recording under the "work for hire" doctrine, allowing
the record company to license the reproduction, distribution, making of
derivative works, and public performance of the recording for certain dig10 3
ital broadcasts.
As discussed in Part II.B.2., SoundExchange is the only organization
that administers compulsory licenses for the public performance of digital audio transmissions of sound recordings under section 114 of the U.S.

Copyright Act. When distributing the royalties for the compulsory licenses that it administers, SoundExchange gives 50% directly to the artists (45% to featured artists and 5% to non-featured artists, if any), and
50% to the record companies who own the recording.' 0 4 SoundExchange
collects royalties for all featured performers and record companies, regardless of whether the performers or record companies have joined
99. PASSMAN, supra note 48, at 213. Mechanical royalties are monies paid on the sales
of records by record companies who make and distribute them. Id. at 212. The mechanical
license is a compulsory one and is pursuant to section 115 of the Copyright Act. The statutory rate under a mechanical license is set by the Copyright Royalty Board. KOHN, supra
note 13, at 1317. A compulsory license is a license created pursuant to legislation, meaning
the rights holders (in this case music publishers) cannot prevent users (in this case record
companies) from obtaining a license to use the copyrighted works (for example, the making
and selling of CDs by record companies).
100. KOHN, supra note 13, at 1317.
101. See Harryfox.com, Digital Licensing, http://www.harryfox.com/public/licenseeServicesDigital.jsp (last visited Apr. 16, 2008). In addition, Harry Fox offers "New Media"
licenses for limited-use downloads, interactive streaming, ringtones, lyrics, and more. Id.
102. KOHN, supra note 13, at 1306. The standard agreement between a record company
and an artist states that the artist is to make recordings exclusively for the record company
for a certain duration, which is measured by a certain number of recordings. KRASILOVSKY,
supra note 85, at 11-12. The record company agrees to pay all of the recording costs involved in the recording of a song with the costs being later recouped from royalties, if any,
payable to the artist. Id. at 24. Artists are usually compensated pursuant to a contract.
Id.
103.

KRAsILOVSKY, supra note 85, at 24.

104. See Soundexchange.com,
2008).

http://www.soundexchange.com/

(last visited

May 1,
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SoundExchange.' 0 5 SoundExchange then attempts to locate all performers and record companies to whom royalties are owed, if SoundExchange
10 6
has their required contact information.
If the online digital audio transmission service is not exempt under
section 114(d)(1) of the U.S. Copyright Act or subject to a compulsory
license under section 114(d)(2) of the U.S. Copyright Act, then the service
must license directly with the record companies for the public performance right of the sound recording. Record companies prefer this because
they may deny licenses or they may negotiate any royalty fee or terms
that they wish. In addition, the record company will then collect the royalties from the music service directly, recouping the performers' contractual share against the money the record company spent on the
performers in producing and marketing the sound recording. This contrasts with the compulsory license administered by SoundExchange
under section 114(d)(2), whereby SoundExchange collects the royalties
and distributes the performer's share directly to the performer.
IV. THE LICENSING OF PERFORMANCE
RIGHTS INTERNATIONALLY
Licensing the public performance right of music is big business. According to the National Music Publishers' Association's latest International Survey of Music Publishing Revenues, internationally, 46% of
10 7
royalty income collected by all CROs was for the performance right.
This 46% constituted over $3 billion dollars.' 0 8 For the U.S. CROs, the
total revenue from performance royalties domestically and internationally in 2001 was approximately $915 million dollars. 10 9 The greatest
area of income growth for ASCAP and BMI in recent years has been the
royalties received from foreign CROs. 110 This rise in overseas revenues
has been the result of the increased popularity of United States music
and an increase in the number of foreign television and radio stations."'
A.

PUBLIC PERFORMANCE OF MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS

Every country in the world that has a major music market has a
105. Interview with Mike Huppe, General Counsel of SoundExchange, in Alexandria,
VA (Mar. 21, 2008).
106. Id.
107. NMPA International Survey of Music Publishing Revenues 7, Chart 2, availableat,

http://www.nmpa.org/pressroom/surveys/twelvth/NMPA-International-Survey-12th-Edition.pdf.
108. Id. at Table 6.

109. Id.
110. BIEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 669.
111. Id.
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CRO. 1 1 2 In order to collect royalties for the public performance of their
repertoire of songs in a foreign country, CROs enter into a reciprocal
1 13 Each CRO has enagreement with the CRO in that foreign country.
tered into a reciprocal agreement with most, if not all, of the world's
CROs.

1 14

All CROs use some form of blanket licensing to license out the public
performance right of the repertoire of songs belonging to their members
as well as the repertoire of other CROs with whom they have a reciprocal
agreement. 1 1 5 BMI, for example, which is a United States CRO, grants
to U.S. online music providers a blanket license to perform any song in
BMI's repertoire publicly. However, the license grants the online music
provider the right to perform the repertoire publicly only within the
United States.'1 6 The blanket license that BMI grants includes the repertoire of songs belonging to BMI's affiliates,1 17 in addition to all of the
songs in the repertoires of each foreign CRO that BMI has entered into a
territorially restrictive reciprocal agreement with. In addition to collecting royalties on behalf of its own affiliates, BMI, pursuant to the reciprocal agreements, collects royalties for the performance in the United
States of the songs in the repertoires of the foreign CROs that BMI has
entered into an agreement with. 118 After deducting an administrative
fee, BMI forwards the royalties collected in the United States for the
public performance of the foreign repertoires to the foreign CROs who, in
turn, distribute the monies to their songwriter or publisher members. 1 19
In addition, pursuant to the reciprocal agreements they have with
BMI, the foreign CROs license BMI's repertoire in their respective territories and collect public performance royalties for the public performance
of BMI's repertoire in their respective territories. 120 The foreign CROs,
after deducting an administrative fee, send these royalties to BMI, who
112. KOHN, supra note 13, at 317. If a country does not have a CRO, one of the bigger
CROs from another country will administer the collection of performance royalties in that
country. Id.
113. Id.
114. BIEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 669.
115. KOHN, supra note 13, at 317.
116. Dr. Lucie Guilbault, When Will We Have Cross-Border Licensing of Copyright and
Related Rights in Europe?, eCopyright Bulletin, April-June 2005, at 2, available at, http:ll
portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/27418/1151415346lguibault-en.pdflguibault-en.pdf (noting how the traditional agreements between CROs result in the CROs being restricted to
grant licenses to online music providers that are valid only within the territory of the
granting society).
117. BMI refers to its members as "affiliates.' See BMI.com, BMI Affiliate Overview,
http://www.bmi.com/international/entry/C2259?link=footer (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
118. BIEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 669.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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distributes the royalties to its songwriter and publisher affiliates. 12 1
Royalties collected for the public performance of the repertoires of foreign CROs are distributed to the foreign songwriters and publishers ac12 2
cording to the distribution ratio used by that foreign CRO.
Many music publishers, however, bypass the CROs. Music publishers do this by entering into an agreement with a publisher in each major
overseas market, whereby the foreign publisher collects performance
12 3
royalties in the foreign country for the other publisher's repertoire.
This process is called subpublishing. 1 24 In the subpublisher arrangement, publishers are designated as either an original publisher or a subpublisher, depending on which one is collecting or distributing royalties
at any given time. 12 5 This method may be preferred for various reasons,
including expedited collection of royalties, better vigilance in claiming
rights, and retention of foreign revenue for local expenditures. 1 2 6 If a
publisher has a subpublisher in a foreign country, the publisher, the
original publisher, will inform the CRO of that foreign country that the
CRO is to distribute the original publisher's royalty share to the original
121. Id.
122. An example may be helpful. Let us look at the distribution of royalties between
ASCAP and BUMA, the Dutch CRO. BUMA must distribute the royalties from ASCAP's
songs in a 50/50 manner between the U.S. writers and publishers represented by ASCAP,
as is done in the United States. Therefore, BUMA would distribute fifty percent of the
royalties to the writers, which means BUMA pays ASCAP fifty percent of the royalties,
which ASCAP distributes directly to its U.S. writer members. BUMA will distribute the
U.S. publisher's fifty percent share directly to ASCAP as well. ASCAP will then distribute
the royalties to its U.S. publisher members. However, if a U.S. publisher has appointed a
subpublisher in the Netherlands, the U.S. publisher will inform BUMA of such. BUMA
will then pay the Dutch publisher, who is acting as the subpublisher for the U.S. "original"
publisher, the U.S. original publisher's share instead of giving the share to ASCAP. KOHN,
supra note 13, at 331. However, not all CROs distribute to writers and publishers on a 50/
50 basis like the U.S. CROs. In the Netherlands, BUMA distributes two-thirds of royalties
to writers and one-third to publishers. Therefore, when ASCAP collects royalties for
BUMA's songs played in the United States, ASCAP gives two-thirds of the royalties to
BUMA, who distributes the royalties to the writers represented by BUMA. The remaining
one-third is given to BUMA to distribute to the Dutch music publishers. If a Dutch publisher has a U.S. subpublisher, then ASCAP gives that Dutch publisher's, i.e. the "original"
publisher's, one-third share to the U.S. subpublisher, who then distribute it to the Dutch
"original publisher."
123. KOHN, supra note 13, at 315.
124. Id.
125. Id. For example, a U.S. music publisher such as Warner would enter into an agreement with a German music publisher. Warner, in the position of original publisher, would
have the German publisher (sub-publisher) promote Warner's songs and collect Warner's
royalties and income in the German market. Conversely, if the German publisher is in the
position of original publisher and Warner is in the role of sub-publisher, then Warner will
promote the use of the German publisher's music, and collect and distribute the German
publisher's royalties and income.
126. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 85, at 150.
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publisher's subpublisher in that country and not to the CRO of the original publisher's country.
The major reason publishers resort to subpublishing, however, is the
large amount of foreign performance royalties not paid to United States
rights holders because of difficulties in identifying American songs with
translated or new titles. 1 27 Foreign subpublishers in agreement with a
United States original publisher, for example, can identify U.S. songs in
all their forms and under different titles and collect the performance royalties for these songs, which would otherwise go unidentified. The subpublisher, therefore, makes sure that the original publisher gets
royalties for the performance of all of it songs, regardless of the song's
translated title or version of the song. If the foreign subpublisher did not
identify these U.S. songs and collect the royalties for the public performance of them, foreign CROs, unable to identify to whom the royalties
should go, would place the undistributed royalties into general funds,
which would then be distributed amongst foreign CROs and their
1 28
members.
B.

PUBLIC PERFORMANCE OF SOUND RECORDINGS

As discussed in Part II.B.2., the U.S. Copyright Royalty Board has
designated SoundExchange to administer compulsory licenses for the
public performance right of sound recordings under section 114 of the
U.S. Copyright Act. The compulsory licenses cover only ephemeral copies and certain digital transmissions. SoundExchange administers these
compulsory licenses to online music providers in the United States and
collects the royalties from these licenses.
SoundExchange has also entered into reciprocal agreements with
some foreign CROs, but not all. 1 2 9 The foreign CROs that
SoundExchange deals with can be divided into three types, based on the
rights that the foreign CRO manages. 130 Some CROs license and collect
royalties only for the record companies, others license and collect only for
performers, and still others collect for both record companies and performers. 13 1 The following is a description of how SoundExchange collects royalties from foreign CROs for the public performance of U.S.
sound recordings in foreign countries.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Lehning Email, supra note 79. Negotiating reciprocal agreements with every CRO
would be too much of a financial burden on SoundExchange at this point. Id. The logistics
and operational issues surrounding these deals are quite complicated. Id.
130. Telephone Interview with Ryan Lehning, Senior Counsel SoundExchange (May 1,
2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Lehning Interview].
131. Id.
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As noted before, SoundExchange collects performance royalties for
all U.S. rights holders, regardless of whether the rights holders have
signed up with SoundExchange. 13 2 SoundExchange will make the effort
to locate the non-member performers and record companies and give
them their royalties, if SoundExchange has their contact information. 133
However, SoundExchange only collects the foreign royalties of its actual
members (i.e. featured artists and record labels who have registered with
SoundExchange and granted SoundExchange the right to collect foreign
royalties). 134 Therefore, when SoundExchange contacts a foreign CRO,
it presents the foreign CRO with a mandate, a list of all the sound recordings belonging to SoundExchange members. 13 5 The foreign CRO
will then transfer to SoundExchange the royalties that the foreign CRO
has collected for those songs.136 However, because of material reciprocity, foreign CROs only distribute the royalties to SoundExchange for the
very same rights for which SoundExchange collects in the United
37
States.1
Once SoundExchange receives these royalties from the foreign CRO,
it distributes them. For whom the foreign CRO has collected the royalties determines the distribution. If the foreign CRO only collects the
public performance right for performers, then SoundExchange distributes the royalties to its featured performer members for whom the foreign CRO has collected. 138 If the foreign CRO only collects for record
companies, SoundExchange collects and distributes the money to its U.S.
record company members for whom the foreign CRO has collected royalties. 13 9 If the foreign CRO collects for both performers and record companies, it will inform SoundExchange what percentage of the royalties go
to each party. 1 40 Large record companies do not ask SoundExchange to
132. Id.
133. Lehning Email, supra note 49.
134. Lehning Interview, supra note 130.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. SoundExchange does not license or collect royalties for the public performance
of sound recordings by terrestrial radio and television broadcasts or from interactive digital
music services. Material reciprocity means that foreign CROs are not going to give
SoundExchange royalties for certain public performances of U.S. sound recordings in their
country if SoundExchange does not collect the same royalties for foreign artists in the
United States.
138. Id. If the foreign CRO has collected for non-featured performers, SoundExchange
does not distribute this money to U.S. non-featured artists. Id. Instead, SoundExchange
distributes this money to two organizations: the American Federation of Musicians and the
American Federation of Television and Radio Broadcasts. Id. For an explanation of what a
"featured artist" is, see Soundexchange.com, Artist's Questions, "What is a featured artist?",http://www.soundexchange.com/ (last visited May 1, 2008).
139. Lehning Interview, supra note 130.
140. Id.
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collect their foreign royalties. Instead, large record companies have foreign affiliates in each music market who collect foreign performance roy14 1
alties on the large record company's behalf.
V.

TYPES OF DIGITAL AUDIO TRANSMISSIONS AND
THE RIGHTS INVOLVED

Songs and other information on the Internet transmit digitally in
the form of binary code, which allows the receiver of the information to
download or perceive, whether visually or auditorially, an exact copy of
the information sent. 14 2 The digital transmissions that transmit music
are called digital audio transmissions. 1 4 3 Below are the two main types

of digital audio transmissions - streaming and downloading.
A.

STREAMING

Streaming results in temporary, buffer copies, called ephemeral copies, of the streamed media being stored on the random access memory
("RAM") of the user's computer. 14 4 The computer plays these buffered
copies while the rest of the file transmits, buffers, and plays in a continuous process, leaving no permanent file on the user's computer. 1 45 This
allows a user to view or listen within seconds to large, compressed files,
such as audio and video files, instead of having to wait until the entire
file downloads.1 4 6 Files are not usually saved to one's computer as a result of streaming. 14 7 However, software is available that allows one to
download streamed music.

1 48

141. Id.
142. KOHN, supra note 13, at 1257.
143. Id.
144. Matt Jackson, From Broadcast to Webcast: Copyright Law and Streaming Media,
11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 447, 451 (2003).
145. The Linux Information Project, Streaming Definition, http://www.linfo.org/streaming.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Techcrunch.com, Freemusiczilla: Best Downloader I've Tested, http://www.
(last visited
techcrunch.com/2008/01/02/freemusiczilla-best-music-downloader-ive-tested/
Apr. 24, 2005). Once downloaded, the software notes all songs streaming on sites like
Last.fm, Pandora, Seeqpod, etc. and allows the user to download any songs streaming on
these sites. Id. Radiotracker software tracks all the songs streamed by online radio stations. See All-streaming-media.com, http://all-streaming-media.com/record-audio-stream/
RadioTracker-Icecast-Shoutcast-grabber-Find-mp3-internet-radio-stations-playing-yourfavorite-music-and-record-them.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2008). The consumer simply
types in whatever songs he orshe wants to download. Id. The Radiotracker software will
monitor the playlist of numerous radio stations and will download the songs off the playlist
as soon as one of the sites plays the song. Id. The software is able to anticipate which
songs are about to play because each song has a digital code on it, providing information
about the title, artist, etc. Id.
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Webcasting is a type of streaming and usually refers to the non-in14 9
teractive streaming of live or recorded broadcasts over the Internet.
In the United States, streaming and webcasting usually only constitute
the public performance right and not the reproduction right. 1 50 A music
provider who streams music in the United States must always acquire a
public performance license from the U.S. CROs for the public performance right in the musical composition. 1 5 1 In addition, a music provider
is required to obtain a license for the public performance of the sound
recording. The type of license required, if any, depends on how the
DMCA categorizes the streamed transmission service. The streamed
transmission may require no license in certain circumstances, it may require a compulsory license, 1 5 2 or it may require that the service provider
153
negotiate directly with the record companies for a voluntary license.
There are two types of online services that transmit music: interactive and non-interactive services. An interactive transmission service is
defined by the U.S. Copyright Office as "one that enables a member of
the public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the
recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound recording ... [that] is selected by or on behalf of the recipient."1 5 4 A non-inter149. Wikipedia.com, Webcast, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Webcasting (last visited Apr.
16, 2008).
150. KOHN, supra note 13, at 1258.
151. Id. at 1347. U.S. CROs grant blanket licenses to interactive websites, just as they
do to terrestrial radio. Id. at 1328.
152. The Copyright Royalty Board recently concluded that the commercial webcasters
usage fees are to be determined on a per-performance fee structure. In the Matter of Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2005-1
CRB DTRA, April 23, 2007, at 25 (CRB 2007), availableat, http://www.webcasters.org/publications/DWT%20-%20Internet%20Radio%20Handout.pdf. Noncommercial services will
pay an annual flat per-station rate. Id. at 29. Small commercial webcasters (those with
less than $1.2 million in revenue), were worried that the per song royalty fees would put
them out of business. In 2002, the small commercial webcasters reached an agreement
with the recording industry that allowed the webcasters to pay a percentage of their revenue. Davis D. Oxenford, Internet Radio: The Basics of Your Music Royalty Obligations,
Aug. 2006, at 7-8, available at, http://www.webcasters.org/publications/DWT - Internet Radio Handout.pdf. This agreement resulted in the passage by Congress of the Small Webcasters Settlement Act. Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 16
Stat. 2780 (2002), available at, http://www.copyright.gov/legislationpll07-321.pdf.
153. KOHN, supra note 13, at 1347. A voluntary license means that the record company
can charge any fee that it wishes. Id. If a service provides on-demand streaming, allowing
users to choose the streamed songs, that service provider must obtain a mechanical license
from Harry Fox, which covers the reproduction and distribution rights. Harryfox.com, Digital Licensing, http://www.harryfox.com/public/infoFAQDigitalLicensing'jsp (last visited
Apr. 16, 2008).
154. 17 U.S.C. §114(j)(7) (2007). Transmission services will also be interactive if the
songs transmitted "substantially consist" of songs picked by listeners and transmitted either to the entire audience or directly to the selecting individual within one hour after the
songs are selected. Id. In addition, a transmission service will be interactive if the service
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to the public
active service is similar to a broadcast in that it transmits
15 5
at large, without interaction from individual consumers.
Interactive music services cannot acquire a compulsory license

under section 114 of the U.S. Copyright Act. 15 6 Instead, providers of interactive online music services must negotiate directly with the rights
holders of sound recordings, i.e. the record companies, for the right to
perform the sound recordings online publicly. 15 7 The reason for this is if
consumers are able to interact with a website, allowing them to choose
hear a certain song whenever they wanted, it is likely that the consumer
will not buy a recording of the song, whether on a CD or through a digital
1 58
download.
There are two types of non-interactive transmissions: subscription
and non-subscription transmissions. The U.S. Copyright Office defines a
"subscription transmission" as a transmission "that is controlled and
limited to particular recipients, and for which consideration is required
to be paid or otherwise given by or on behalf of the recipient to receive
the transmission or a package of transmissions including the transmission. '' 15 9 A "non-subscription transmission is any transmission that is
160
not a subscription transmission."
Simulcasting is another form of streaming on the Internet. Simulcasting is "the simultaneous transmission by radio and TV stations via
the Internet of sound recordings included in their broadcasts of radio
and/or TV signals."1 6 1 Lastly, podcasting is a type of streaming that allows one to view syndicated programs on portable devices, such as iPods
16 2
(hence the name "podcasting").

.,substantially consist(s)" of songs transmitted to listeners at times pre-designated by listeners. Id.
155. KOHN, supra note 13, at 1259. There are two types of non-interactive transmission
services: subscription and non-subscription transmission services. Id. at 1333.
156. See Part II.B.A. for an explanation of the DMCA licensing regime.
157. Carson, supra note 50, at 20.
158. KOHN, supra note 13, at 1333.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(14) (2007). Certain non-interactive, subscription and non-interactive, non-subscription services are eligible for a compulsory license in the U.S. Id.
§ 114(d)(2).
160. Id. §114(j)(9).
IFPI "Simulcasting," Oct. 8,
161. Commission Decision, Case No COMP/C2/38.014
2002, at Part A.2., available at, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/38014/en.pdf. Simulcasters, whose services are non-subscription, pay the fees for
their terrestrial broadcast, which covers their simulcast signal of the broadcast over the
Internet. Oxenford, supra note 152.
162. Ltider, supra note 7, at 18.
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DIGITAL PHONOGRAM DELIVERIES, I.E. PERMANENT DOWNLOADS

A digital phonogram delivery ("DPD"), or a permanent download of a
music file, is defined as a music file that the receiver is meant to keep as
his or her own. 1 63 The receiver of the music file can normally use the file
forever, subject to digital rights management ("DRM") software that may
limit the number and kinds of copies that can be made of the file.16 4 A
"limited download," however, allows the receiver of the downloaded song
to use the song as long as their subscription to use the song is in effect. 16 5 Once the subscription has expired, DRM software attached to
166
the downloaded song will prevent its further use.
VI.

BRIEF COMPARISON OF ONLINE RIGHTS AND CROS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

This Part will look at the music markets of the United States and
the European Union ("E.U.") for two reasons. First, these two music
markets are the largest in the world. 16 7 Second, the E.U. will be the first
market where CROs adopt a multiterritorial licensing regime, either of
their own accord or pursuant to future legislation passed by the E.U.
government.168
A.

LOOK AT THE UNITED STATES

Most of the rest of the world considers a download and a stream to
constitute both a reproduction and a public performance. 16 9 Unfortu163. Decision of the Board, Statement of Royalties to Be Collected by SOCAN for the
Communication to the Public by Telecommunications, in Canada, of Musical or DramaticoMusical Works [Tariff No. 22.A (Internet - Online Music Services) 1996-2006], at 4-5, Part
III.[131, available at, http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/m20071018-b.pdf [hereinafter Canadian Decision].
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. DRM systems are causing subscription services to fail because the DRM technology would not allow users to transfer their downloaded songs to iPods. See Forbes.com,
Yahoo! Exits Music Subscription Biz, by Louis Hau Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/
2008/02/04/yahoo-rhapsody-music-biz-media-cx lh_0204bizyahoo.html (last visited May 1,
2008) [hereinafter Forbes Yahoo] (describing how Yahoo! exited the subscription music
market because DRM restrictions caused its subscription service to struggle).
167. See NMPA Survey, supra note 107, at 3, Chart 3 (listing the leading countries in
royalty collection; the United States is first, with six of the other top ten spots held by
countries in the E.U.).
168. See Part X infra for a discussion of the status of the E.U. legislative process regarding multiterritorial licensing.
169. Telephone interview and email correspondence with Marvin Berenson, General
Counsel for BMI (Feb. 28 - Apr. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Berenson Interview] (on file with
author); Assessment, supra note 225, at 8 (showing that in the EU downloads and streams
constitute both a reproduction and a public performance right (described as a "right of
communication")).
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nately, it is not so clear in the United States. For example, in United
States v. ASCAP, the court held that a download does not constitute a
public performance. 1 70 However, this was an interlocutory decision to
rule on motions for summary judgment. Therefore, the judge could have
re-addressed the issue and held otherwise when he heard the case on the
merits. However, in the final decision on the merits, the court did not readdress the issue. Therefore, the ruling that downloads in the United
States do not constitute a public performance stands unless appealed
to,
17 1
Circuit.
Second
the
for
Appeals
of
Court
the
by,
and overturned
The traditional right of reproduction includes "the right to produce a
material object in which the work is duplicated, transcribed, imitated, or
simulated in a fixed form from which it can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, directly or with the aid of machine or a device. ' 1 7 2 Traditionally, a record company has been required to obtain a
"mechanical license," which covers the right to reproduce the musical
compositions (usually on CDs today) and the right to distribute those
reproductions. 173 A mechanical license is a compulsory license under
section 115 of the U.S. Copyright Act. 17 4 This means that companies
that want to reproduce and distribute underlying musical compositions
in a sound recording, or online music providers who want to sell DPDs,
i.e. downloads of songs, are able to obtain a license at a rate set by the
Copyright Royalty Board. 1 7 5 Digital downloads, such as downloading a
song file from iTunes onto one's hard drive, clearly constitute a reproduction requiring iTunes to obtain licenses in the United States to reproduce
17 6
the underlying musical composition and the sound recording.
170.

U.S. v. ASCAP, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).

171. Email from Marvin Berenson, General Counsel for BMI (May 5, 2008 9:37 a.m.
EST) (on file with author); U.S. v. ASCAP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36226 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30,
2008).
172. GORMAN, supra note 72, at 345 (citing H.R. Rep. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6162 (1976)) (internal citations omitted).
173. See Harryfox.com, "Do I need a mechanical license?", http://www.harryfox.com/
public/mechanicalLicense.jsp (last visited May 25, 2008).
174. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2007).

175. Id. at § 115(c)(3)(d) (2007).
176. See Jonah Knobler, Performance Anxiety: The Internet and Copyright's Vanishing

Performance/DistributionDistinction,25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 531, 542 (2007), available at, http://www.cardozoaelj.net/issues/08/ Knobler.pdf (providing a detailed discussion
of the controversy in the United States as to what types of digital transmissions implicate
the reproduction, distribution, and public performance rights). The iTunes service, by
transmitting a song to the consumer to download, must obtain a "mechanical license" from
the songwriter or publisher (usually through the Harry Fox Agency) for the reproduction
right of the musical composition. In addition, iTunes must obtain a license from the record
company for the reproduction of the sound recording. When iTunes provides downloads in
certain foreign countries (where a download constitutes a reproduction and a public performance), it may be required to obtain a license from both the publisher and record com-
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Section 112(e) of the U.S. Copyright Act requires online music providers who stream music to acquire a statutory license for the reproduction of the transmitted sound recordings because, during the
transmission, the computer's RAM temporarily saves the sound recordings as buffered, ephemeral copies. 1 7 7 This buffering process allows for
the instant playing of a video, music, or multimedia file without having
to download the file onto the computer's hard drive first. Webcasters and
broadcasters may create one ephemeral copy during the transmission of
a song without charge. 1 78 If the transmission creates more than one
ephemeral copy, however, webcasters and broadcasters are obligated to
obtain compulsory, statutory license. 17 9 There is controversy, however,
as to whether webcasters and broadcasters need the section 112(e) compulsory license. The U.S. Copyright Office has asked Congress to repeal
the 112(e) compulsory license, stating that this compulsory license is an
'aberration" because the temporary buffer copies for which the license is
granted are made solely for enabling an already licensed right, i.e. the
public performance of sound recordings.180
There is also controversy in the United States as to whether interactive transmissions, on-demand streams, 18 1 incidental DPD, and limited
downloads should be required to obtain a compulsory mechanical license
under section 115 of the U.S. Copyright Act. 18 2 The rights holders naturally want these transmissions and DPDs to constitute a reproduction
pany for the reproduction and the public performance of their copyrighted compositions
and sound recordings, respectively.
177. 17 U.S.C. § 112(e) (2007).
178. 17 U.S.C. §112(a)(1); see also In the Matter of Rate Setting for Digital Performance
Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, CARP DTRA 1 & 2, 96 (CARP
2000) (providing a determination of the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (now called
the Copyright Royalty Board) to decide rates for the statutory license for ephemeral copies
under § 112(e)(4)) [hereinafter CARP Hearing].
179. See CARP Hearing, supra note 178, at 96.
180. Testimony of Rob Glaser, Chairman and CEO RealNetworks, Inc., before the
United States Senate Subcommittee on Intellectual Property Committee on the Judiciary,
Hearing on "Music Licensing Reform," July 12, 2005, available at, http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id =1566&witid=4447.
181. There is also an issue of what level of interactivity is required to make a music
service an interactive service, i.e. "on-demand" service. See Lider, supra note 7, at 32
(describing the difficulty in describing exactly what level of interactivity constitutes "ondemand"). For example, the Pandora online music service transmits songs on the Internet
using software that creates a unique "station" for each individual listener based on an individual's prior music selections. Pandora.com, http://www.pandora.coml (last visited May 1,
2008); see also Jango.com, http://www.jango.com/ (last visited May 1, 2008).
182. KOHN, supra note 13, at 1328; see also Glaser, supra note 180 (discussing the disagreement as to whether section 115 extends to on-demand Internet radio services); Interview with Lee Knife, General Counsel for DiMA, Washington, D.C. (June 11, 2008).
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and a public performance.1 8 3 Rights holders' business argument for
their position on this issue is that these types of online music services
allow a consumer to choose which songs they hear and when they hear
them, thereby displacing traditional CD sales and legal digital
downloads. This, of course, will cause the rights holders to lose
money.1 8 4 It does not matter, they argue, that the hard drive on the
consumer's computer made no permanent copy. If consumers can hear a
song whenever they would like by having it streamed to their audio device, then, in essence, they are enjoying the same benefit that would result if they had an actual copy of the song on their listening device. The
legal argument that rights holders use in front of the Copyright Royalty
Board ("CRB") and courts, however, is that during any transmission the
consumer's computer makes copies of the work.1 8 5 They argue that
these copies are reproductions that require a mechanical license.
Music providers, such as webcasters, however, want to pay as little
as possible for the right to offer music. Therefore, they would like there
to be a ruling by a court or the CRB that a download constitutes only18 a6
reproduction and that a stream only constitutes a public performance.
Any type of transmission, other than a pure DPD, may result in ephemeral copies on a consumer's computer, but these copies are only the temporary result of a public performance.1 8 7 The Digital Media Association
("DiMA"), which represents webcasters, recently asked the CRB to rule
that interactive streaming did not constitute a download. However, on
February 5, 2008, the CRB ruled that whether a transmission is interactive or non-interactive is a factual determination that judges must decide
and not a legal question that the Register of Copyrights would decide. 1 88
Every five years the CRB makes a rate determination for the compulsory
183. The Harry Fox Agency, publishers, songwriters, and record companies want
streaming and webcasting to encompass the reproduction right also. This, of course means
that webcasters and providers of streamed music would be required to obtain mechanical
licenses to transmit songs on the Internet The U.S. CROs, songwriters, publishers, and
record companies all want downloads to constitute a public performance instead of just a
reproduction. Again, this means more licenses and more money for the songwriters and
publishers.
184. KOHN, supra note 13, at 1329.
185. Knife Interview, supra note 182.
186. KOHN, supra note 13, at 1328.
187. Knife Interview, supra note 182.
188. BMI.com, Copyright Royalty Board Begins Mechanical Rate Hearing, January 30,
2008, http://www.bmi.com/news/entry/535989/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2008). DiMA, representing webcasters, recently asked the CRB to have the Register of Copyrights, Mary Beth
Peters, decide whether webcasters owe songwriters and publishers mechanical royalties.
Id. Another issue that the CRB may soon be forced to resolve is whether an on-demand
stream is the same as an interactive stream. Wired Blog Network, Listening Post, Copyright Royalty Board Denies DiMA Request, by Eliot Van Buskirk, Feb. 5, 2008, http://
blog.wired.com/music/2008/02/copyright-royal.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
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mechanical license under section 115 that will apply for the subsequent
five years.' 8 9 During the writing of this paper, there was an ongoing
rate determination for the compulsory mechanical license under section
115.190 One of the main issues was whether interactive and on-demand
transmissions, incidental DPDs, 1 9 1 and limited downloads 19 2 required a
mechanical license. 193 DiMA and the music publishers, who were on opposing sides of this issue, were able to come to a settlement on their
own.1 9 4 However, the CRB has suggested, to the surprise and disagreement of all the parties, that it may decide whether interactive and ondemand transmissions, incidental DPDs, and limited downloads require
a mechanical license anyway, completely disregarding the parties' settlement agreement. 19 5 This agreement, however, only applies for the next
three years, at which point the parties will again argue whether interactive and on-demand streaming, incidental DPDs, and limited downloads
19 6
require a mechanical license.
Another controversial subject in the United States is limited
downloads. 19 7 For example, what if one subscribed to have a song
streamed to them five times, whether at different times, at set times, or
simply five times in a row? 19 8 What if one paid for a song file which one
could listen to an unlimited amount of times for thirty days, at which
point the song file would cease to operate? 19 9 Services such as these and
many others blurred the line between what is interactive and non-interactive. Interestingly, the subscription music services are quickly disappearing, being replaced with free online music services, whose sole
189. Knife Interview, supra note 182.
190. Id.
191. Id. Incidental DPDs are described as "digital phonorecord deliveries where the reproduction or distribution of a phonorecord is incidental to the transmission which constitutes the digital phonorecord delivery." 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(C)(i) (2007). Congress,
however, failed to define an "incidental DPD," which naturally leads to disputes as to what

it does mean.
192. See notes 193-96 and accompanying text for a description of limited downloads.
193. Knife Interview, supra note 182.

194. Id. Mr. Knife, of DiMA, stated the settlement was kept confidential until the CRB
decided on the rates for the mechanical license for the reproduction and distribution of
music on CDs and for DPDs. Id. The reason for the secrecy was to allow the CRB to come
to a decision on the rates, uninfluenced by the parties' settlement regarding interactive and
on-demand streaming, incidental DPDs, and limited downloads. Id.

195. Id.
196. Id. The hearings have been going on for about two years, meaning once the CRB

makes its final decision on October 2, 2008, the rates it sets will be retroactive two years.
Id.
197. KOHN, supra note 13, at 1326.
198. Id.
199. Id. Some believe such transmissions should be considered a digital delivery, i.e.
reproduction, and therefore, should be subject to the statutory mechanical license. Id.
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revenue comes from advertising. 20 0
Collective licensing in the United States differs from the rest of the
world, specifically the countries of the European Union ("E.U."), in three
ways. 20 1 First, the European countries, and most countries in the rest of
the world only have one CRO that administers the public performance
right, whereas the United States has three. 20 2 Second, ASCAP and BMI,
pursuant to court ordered consent decrees, may not negotiate exclusive
licenses with songwriters and publishers for the rights to license out
their songs as their European counterparts can. 20 3 Finally, the Harry
Fox Agency does not have a monopoly on mechanical rights, i.e. reprowhereas European
duction and distribution rights, in the United States
20 4
do.
right
mechanical
the
administering
CROs
B.

LOOK AT THE

E.U.

The E.U. grants songwriters the rights of reproduction, communication to the public (i.e. public performance), and making available. 20 5 The
making available right "is an exclusive right for authors, performers, and
'phonogram producers' to authorize or prohibit the dissemination of their
works and other protected material through interactive networks such
as the internet [sic]. "206 Rights holders, in other words, have the exclusive right to make their works available, in such a way that members of
the public may access them whenever they would like. 20 7 Performers in
the E.U. receive the exclusive right to allow reproductions of the fixation
of their performances and the exclusive right to make available. 20 8 In
addition, performers in the E.U. receive a guarantee of equitable remuneration anytime a wireless medium transmits their commercial sound
200. Wired.com, Dying DRM Means More Freedom for Music Fans, by Eliot Van Buskirk, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/commentary/listeningpost/
2007/10/listeningpost_1015 (last visited May 1, 2008); Forbes Yahoo, supra note 166.
201. COLLECTIVE LICENSING: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 30 (James M. Kendrick ed.

2002) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE LICENSING].
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Ltider, supra note 7, at 24. The "making available" right was specifically created
for the online environment and was implemented into the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") treaties (the WIPO Copyright Treaty ('"VCT") and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty ("WPPT"). The WIPO Treaties: 'Making Available' Right 1
(Mar. 2003), available at, http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/wipo-treaties-making-available-right.pdf [hereinafter WIPO Article].
206. WIPO Article, supra note 205, at 1.
207. Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment Reforming Cross-Border Collective of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services, SEC
(2005) 1254, Brussels (Nov. 10, 2005), at 34, available at, http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/copyright/docs/management/sec_2005_1254_en.pdf [hereinafter Assessment].
208. Lider, supra note 7, at 24.
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recording. 20 9 Record companies in the E.U. receive the exclusive right to
2 10
authorize reproduction and the making available of sound recordings.
In the E.U., only songwriters and performers have the exclusive
right of communication to the public. 2 1 ' However, the performer's exclusive right is limited to live performances. 2 12 Therefore, performers do
not have an exclusive right of communication in the online environment. 2 13 However, performers do have the exclusive right to make their
works available, which would apply to online downloads. 2 14 Although
performers and record companies cannot control the public performance
of their sound recordings, in most E.U. countries record producers and
performers have the right to equitable remuneration 2 15 when their
sound recordings are performed publicly, whether online or
2 16
terrestrially.
Therefore, in the E.U., CROs are collecting royalties for the public
communication of sound recordings on terrestrial radio and television
and in commercial establishments. The E.U. CROs are collecting these
royalties for U.S. performers and record companies. However, United
States record companies and performers never see any of this money because of material reciprocity. 2 1 7 United States CROs do not have the
legal authority to collect royalties for the public performance of foreign
sound recordings on terrestrial broadcasts. 2 18 Therefore, the CROs in
other countries, based on material reciprocity, are not obligated to distribute to United States rights holders the royalties collected for the public performance of United States sound recordings on terrestrial
broadcasts in those foreign countries. This means that United States
rights holders of sound recordings are not receiving millions of dollars of
royalties, ultimately keeping millions of dollars out of the pockets of U.S.
record companies and U.S. performers. 2 19 Conversely, there is uncollected money for European rights holders. European rights holders of
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 31.
212. Id. at 32.
213. Id.
214. Luder, supra note 7, at 32.
215. Equitable remuneration is "applying restitutionary fair market value awards in
certain intellectual property disputes." David Brennan, What is Equitable Remuneration
for Intellectual Property Use?, paper prepared for a seminar at Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre, 25 January 2005, availableat, http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP105.
pdf.
216. Luider, supra note 7, at 32 n.140.
217. Telephone Interview with Sam Mosenkis, General Counsel for ASCAP (Apr. 12,
2008).
218. Id.
219. See Cosmic Debris, Public Performance Money and the New Webcasting Royalty,
http://www.cosmik.com/aa-marchO3/mbm92.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
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sound recordings, for example, would realize about $25.5 million per
year in royalties if the CROs in the United States could collect for the
2 20
public performance of sound recordings during terrestrial broadcasts.
In addition, most of the world considers a streamed transmission
and a digital download of a song to implicate both the public performance
right and the reproduction right. 2 2 1 For example, the Canadian Copyright Board, in a decision to set tariffs for the communication, i.e. public
performance, of musical works over the Internet, held that a download,
like a streamed transmission, constitutes a reproduction and a public
performance. 22 2 In the E.U., the right of reproduction online consists of
the right to reproduce the work by making intangible, i.e. digital, copies
by means of an upload, download, on-demand transmission by stream223
ing, or storage on a hard disk.
In the E.U., a public performance occurs when a simulcast or webcast transmits a song or when a consumer downloads a song.2 2 4 An online music provider, such as iTunes, would only be required to license the
mechanical, i.e. reproduction and distribution, right in the United States
for providing a downloading service. However, in Europe, iTunes would
be required to license the public performance of the songs it transmits to
consumers to download because the E.U. recognizes that a digital
download constitutes a "communication to the public" and a
220. Luder, supra note 7, at 12 n. 45.
221. Berenson Email, supra note 169; Assessment, supra note 207, at 8 (showing that in
the E.U. downloads and streams constitute both a reproduction and a public performance
or "communication to the public" right).
222. Canadian Decision, supra note 163, at 29 T 97. In holding that a download is a
communication, the Board reasoned that there is ultimately no difference between a
download and a stream. Id. at 28 95. Both are broken into packets and transmitted to
users upon request. Id. Neither is initially audible because both are stored, even if temporarily in the case of streams, before they can play. Id. The fact that a download has resulted in the user receiving the content was, for the court, evidence that the content was
communicated. Id. Next, the Board reasoned that the communicating of the download was
public because "downloads are targeted by an aggregation of individuals." Id. at 28 9197. It
does not matter that various individuals do not listen to the communication simultaneously. Id. at 29 9198. Would an Internet poster of a copyrighted text not be liable for
communicating the text to the public even though numerous users may not read the unauthorized posting of the text simultaneously? Id.
223. Assessment, supra note 207, at 8. Brussels Court of First Instance held that news
articles stored on Google servers constituted a violation of the rights holders' right of reproduction. Ltider, supra note 7, at 30. It did not matter that the images were stored as code.
The only relevant fact was that a fixation had occurred. Id. German courts have held that
thumbnail images used by search engines on the Internet infringed the rights holder's
right of reproduction. Although the user triggered the copy when visiting the search engine's website, the search engine initiated the reproduction by making the thumbnails
available. Id. at 31.
224. Assessment, supra note 207, at 8.
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reproduction. 2 25
In most E.U. Member States, CROs administer the songwriters' re2 26
production, public performance, and right to make works available.
In some E.U. Member States, separate CROs administer the right of reproduction and public performance. 22 7 The performers' and record companies' right to receive equitable remuneration is administered by one
CRO in most E.U. Member States. 2 28 Record companies manage their
229
own right to make works available.
VII.

THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF TERRITORIALLY
RESTRICTIVE LICENSING
A.

TERRITORIALITY IN COPYRIGHT

Copyright law is territorial in nature. 2 30 The copyright laws of the
country in which protection is sought protects a musical work. If one
country protects a work or a certain right in that work, it does not necessarily mean that another country protects the work to the same extent. 23 1 In the United States, for example, the courts have historically
been reluctant to apply United States copyright laws to any actions occurring outside of the borders of the United States. 2 32 Article 5(2) of the
Berne Convention further supports the fact that copyright is territorial.
Article 5(2) provides that copyright protection "shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed. '2 3 3 This
means that if a rights holder in country X sues an infringer in country Y
for infringement in country Y, the determination of whether there was
an infringement will be decided by the copyright laws of the forum, Y,
the protecting country and not the copyright laws of X, the country of
225. Id.
226. Lider, supra note 7, at 24-25; see Commission Staff Working Document: Study on a
Community Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyright, Brussels,
July 7, 2005, at 59-60, available at, http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/copyright/docs/

management/study-collectivemgmt-en.pdf (providing a chart of all the major European
CROs and the rights that they administer) [hereinafter Commission Study].

227.
228.
229.
230.

Lfider, supra note 7, at 24-25.
Id.
Id.
Andreas P. Reindl, Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts on Global
Networks, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 799, 800 (1998).
231. Id.
232. See Curtis A. Bradley, TerritorialIntellectual Property Rights in an Age of Global-

ism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505 (1997) (describing the presumption against extraterritorial application of United States copyright law and United States law in general).
233. Reindl, supranote 230, at 800; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 5(2), UNTS 221, 232.
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2 34
origin for the copyright.
The current licensing regime between CROs of different countries
consists of territorially restrictive reciprocal agreements. 23 5 ASCAP and
BMI, for example, grant public performance licenses only for the United
States and its territories and only to users with a residence in the United
States. 2 3 6 The practice of reciprocal agreements began in the 1800s.
The first European CRO, Societ6 des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs
de Musique ("SACEM"), was established in 1851 in France. 2 3 7 SACEM
did not have reciprocal agreements with other CROs because other CROs
did not yet exist in Europe. 238 Therefore, SACEM would collect royalties
for its French repertoire of songs by going directly into countries such as
Switzerland, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. 2 39 However, in 1914,
the United Kingdom ("U.K.") established its own CRO,called the Performing Rights Society ("PRS"). 2 40 There was naturally resentment on
the part of PRS that SACEM was enforcing direct payments from U.K.
citizens, within the territory of the U.K., based upon the enforcement of
copyrights that existed only under French law. 24 1 Therefore, the first
territorially-based reciprocal agreement was entered into between PRS
and SACEM where PRS collected royalties for the use of the French repertoire of songs in the U.K. and distributed the royalties to SACEM.
SACEM collected royalties for the use of U.K. songs in France and dis242
tributed these royalties to PRS.

234. Paul Edward Geller, Conflicts of Laws in Copyright Cases: Infringement and Ownership Issues, 51 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 315, 329 (2004).

235. See Guibault, supra note 116, at 2 (describing the current system of reciprocal
agreements between societies).
236. See BMI Web Site Music Performance Agreement, at Part 3.B., available at, http://
www.bmi.com/forms/licensing/internet.pdf. The BMI online license states,
[t]he territorial scope of the grant of rights with respect to any musical works
which are affiliated with BMI through a non-U.S. performing right licensing organization not listed on the New Media Territories List is limited to public performances in the U.S. Territory. Public performances of such musical works
outside of the U.S. Territory may be subject to appropriate separate licensing.
Id. ASCAP's online license agreement states, "[t]his license is limited to the United States
and to transmissions originating from the United States, its territories and possessions,
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." See ASCAP Experimental License Agreement for
Internet Sites & Services, at Part 6.(c)., available at, http://www.ascap.com/weblicense/
release5.0.pdf.
237. See supra, note 37.

238. Ltider, supra note 7, at 47.
239. Id.
240. Id.

241. Id.
242. Id.
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B.

THE ONLINE Music MARKET

As more people get access to the Internet, the number of potential
music listeners increases. Consumer spending on online music more
than doubled from 2005 to 2008.243 In 2007, 17.8% of the world's population used the Internet. 2 44 With the increase in listeners comes increased
profits in the form of payments for downloads of songs, subscription fees
for subscription services, and advertising fees for non-subscription services such as webcasters.
Digital music sales worldwide were approximately $2 billion in
2006.245 Single track downloads worldwide were about 795 million in
2006, up 89% from 2005.246 Online sales of entire albums in the United
States increased from six million to thirty-three million from 2004 to
2006 - a 450% increase. 2 4 7 In 2007, there were over 500 legitimate, i.e.
legal, music services in over forty countries. 2 48 By 2010, it is estimated
that one quarter of all music sales will be digital downloads. 2 4 9 In addition, Internet advertising will likely exceed advertising on traditional radio broadcasting by 2010.250
Individuals and companies realize the incredible potential for profit
on the Internet and are constantly finding new ways to provide music to
consumers around the world. Some of the new means for transmission of
music online are through downloads to music phones and phones with
3G technology. 2 5 1 Cell phones now have the ability to play actual sound
recordings as ring tones. 2 5 2 Online networks such as MySpace are providing a new market for the music industry. 2 53 Music subscription services, such as Napster and Rhapsody, grew by 25% in 2006, reaching 3.5
million users in 2007.254 Last.fm, with over 20 million users, is a free
243. Luider, supra note 7, at 16.

244. Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm (last visited April 15, 2008). Compare this to 15.7% of world in 2005.
BIEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 897.
245. IFPI 207 Digital Music Report, at 4, available at, http://www.ifpi.org/content/li-

brary/digital-music-report-2007.pdf [hereinafter IFPI Report].
246. Id.

247. Knobler, supra note 176, at 533. CDs sales in the United States decreased by
17.5% from 2006 to 2007 with digital downloads increasing over 38% during the same period. RIAA Year End Shipment Statistics, available at, http://76.74.24.142/81128FFD-

028F-282E-1CE5-FDBF16A46388.pdf.
248. IFPI Report, supra note 245, at 8.

249. Id.
250. Id.
251. 3G
that allows

at 3.
at 12.
technology, which has taken off in Asia, is a third generation mobile technology
for faster downloads of music and video files as well as faster streaming. Id. at

10.
252. IFPI Report, supra note 245, at 10.
253. Id. at 12.
254. Id. at 13.
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on-demand online music service that pays royalties to rights holders
255
with advertising fees.
This rapid development of new methods and platforms for transmitting and delivering music online is resulting in an increase in the crossborder transmission of online music. 2 56 Despite the fact that Internet
transmissions are cross-border, CROs still license music online in a territorially restrictive manner. This rapid development of cross-border
transmissions increases the need to dispense with the territorially restrictive licensing of online music and to replace it with a multiterritorial
or global licensing regime.
C.

PROBLEMS THAT TERRITORIALLY RESTRICTIVE LICENSING
OF ONLINE MUSIC CREATES

The main issue is whether the traditional method of granting territorially restrictive reciprocal agreements is adequate in the online environment. The answer is no. Territorial licensing, which is restricted to
25 7
national boundaries has no place in the licensing of music online.
Territorial licensing began in Europe in the eighteenth century. Musicians and composers formed national rights organizations in an attempt
to control and license the reproduction of sheet music and the public performance of their songs in cafes and restaurants. The need for CROs in
the pre-Internet world was obvious. Individual performers did not have
the means to police every public establishment to enforce their right of
public performance by making sure establishments had a license to perform their songs. Conversely, public establishments did not have the
means to seek out every songwriter and composer in order to obtain a
255. Last.fm Becomes Fastest Growing Free Online Music Network in the U.S., PR
Newswire Association LLC, Feb. 22, 2008; see also Blog.wired.com., All Major Labels to
Stream Music Free on Last.fm., http://blog.wired.com/music/2008/01/liveblog-the-cb.html
(last visited May 2, 2008).
256. Ltider, supra note 7, at 17.
257. Guibault, supra note 116, at 3 (noting how the current system of licensing music
online using licenses which are territorially restrictive is incompatible with the cross-border transmissions of the Internet); see also Herbert Ungerer, Application of Competition
Law to Rights Management in the Music Market, Panel: Independent Music Companies
Association ("IMPALA"), June 11, 2003, COMP/C2/HU/rdu, at 5, available at, http://
ec.europa.eu/comm/competitionlspeeches/text/sp2003_018_en.pdf (stating that the "territorial restrictions in the administration of rights can no longer be seen as indispensable for
effective management of rights"); Patrick Boiron (Partner at Moquet Borde et Associ~s),
The Simulcast Decision: Toward a Competitive Environment for Collective Administration
Societies, , at 2, available at, http://www.iael.org/media/IAEL-articleBoiron.pdf (stating
that the present system of only licensing music on a national level is no longer compatible
with digital transmissions that are accessible worldwide). This system requires online music providers to obtain a license in each country where their transmissions are accessible,
resulting in complicated procedures, costs, and generalized disregard of copyright and
other rights.
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license for each song the establishment played. The solution to this logistical problem was a CRO that acted as a clearinghouse and an enforcement entity for the public performance and/or the reproduction
right for a multitude of compositions or recordings.
Based on the territoriality of copyrights and sovereignty of nation
states, a CRO from country A was not able to go into country B to enforce
country A's copyright laws by licensing songs and collecting royalties for
the exploitation of songs belonging to citizens of country A. Therefore, if
country A's works were accessible in country B, the CRO of country A
would enter into a reciprocal agreement with the CRO in country B.
This agreement would allow the CRO of country A to exploit the repertoire of country B commercially within country A. The CRO in country B
would have the right to exploit the repertoire of country A commercially
within country B. CROs in each country, through a network of reciprocal
agreements with almost every other CRO, have been able to license their
2 58
repertoire of music globally in a piecemeal manner.
However, these reciprocal agreements, which include a territorial
restriction clause, are inefficient and unnecessary for the licensing of
music online. In fact, they are no longer justified. 25 9 They only perpetuate a long-established monopoly in the off-line market. 260 The monopoly
consists of CROs controlling all transmissions within their respective
territories and limiting the transmissions of their own repertoires on a
territory-by-territory basis. These reciprocal agreements are based on
the physical realities of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth
century and are not applicable to the licensing of music online. 2 61 In
addition, these agreements hamper the development of the online music
market by making it incredibly difficult and expensive for online music
providers to clear rights (ensuring they are not infringing copyrights or
reciprocal agreements in the country of destination) in each country in
262
which their transmission will be accessible.
An example of how territorially restrictive licensing works is helpful
in understanding why there is no justification for it in the online environment. 2 63 For example, a webcaster based in the United States goes to
258. Commission Study, supra note 226, at 9.

259. Email from Alain Andri~s of the E.U. Directorate General for Competition (Apr. 16,
2008, 11:17 a.m. EST) (on file with author).
260. Id.
261. Lehman Interview, supra note 46. These territorially restrictive reciprocal agreements created a licensing monopoly for CROs in their respective territories. However,
these monopolies were tolerated because they were the only effective means of protection
for holders' rights. Ungerer, supra note 257, at 5.
262. Interview with Lee Knife, General Counsel for Digital Media Association ("DiMA"),
Washington, D.C. (April 24, 2008) [hereinafter Knife Interview].
263. The problem with territorially restrictive licensing affects the licensing of all rights
enforced by CROs, not just the public performance right. Therefore, the same problems
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BMI, one of the three performance right CROs in the United States. The
webcaster pays a fee to BMI for a blanket license to transmit BMI's entire repertoire only within the United States and its territories. However, the webcaster's Internet transmissions will not end at the U.S.
border; they will be accessible by anyone in the world with an Internet
connection. Therein lies the problem. BMI has its own repertoire, consisting of songs by U.S. songwriters. Technically, BMI could grant26 a4
worldwide license to the U.S. webcaster for BMI's own U.S. repertoire.
However, this does not happen because each territory has a reciprocal
26 5
agreement with BMI restricting the granting of such a license.
If the United States webcaster, in the above example, transmits
"Crazy," written by Willie Nelson, that song will be accessible in every
country with a computer and an Internet connection. When this happens, the territorially restrictive reciprocal arrangements between CROs
create four potential problems for online music providers, all of which
create legal uncertainty for the providers.
The first problem is that the present system of licensing causes an
online music provider to infringe the public performance right of the
rights holders residing in the territory that the provider resides. Using
the above example, let us say that citizens in the U.K. will be able to
access and listen to the song "Crazy," which is transmitted by the United
States webcaster. The U.S. webcaster, with a blanket license from BMI,
only has a license to perform the song "Crazy" publicly in the United
States. However, a performance is also occurring in the U.K. (and any
other country where a person is listening to the transmission). This
means that the U.S. webcaster is infringing Willie Nelson's right of public performance 26 6 by publicly performing in a territory, the U.K., that
Willie Nelson, through BMI, did not authorize. PRS, the CRO for the
U.K., through a reciprocal agreement with BMI, has the exclusive au-

arise when users like iTunes attempt to get mechanical licenses in each territory where it
offers the downloading of songs from the Internet. In addition, some countries, such as
those in Europe, have a "making available" right, which would also be subject to territorial
licensing.
264. Andrids Email, supra note 259; Email from Marvin Berenson, General Counsel for
BMI (May 1, 2008, 4:38 p.m. EST).
265. Songwriters and publishers could (especially if they were successful and had bargaining power) simply tell a CRO, like BMI, to grant music services a worldwide license for
their works. Andries Email, supra note 259. When asked why this does not happen, Mr.
Andries of the E.U. Directorate General for Competition noted that songwriters are not
business persons or lawyers. Id.
266. Technically, Willie Nelson would likely have assigned the rights to his song over to
his music publisher. Therefore, the music publisher would be the rights holder in Willie
Nelson's song.
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thority to license the public performance of "Crazy" in the U.K. 2 6 7
Therefore, PRS, on behalf of BMI and the rights holder (Willie Nelson)
could bring a copyright infringement action against the U.S. webcaster.
In order to prevent this and achieve legal certainty, the webcaster must
go to PRS and obtain a license to perform "Crazy" (and the rest of BMI's
repertoire of songs) in the U.K. This same scenario plays out in every
territory that can access the webcaster's transmission outside of the
United States.
The second problem is that the present licensing system causes online music providers to infringe the public performance right of foreign
authors. This problem arises because CROs grant blanket licenses to
users and providers of online music. The blanket licenses that BMI, for
example, grants includes the repertoires of all the foreign CROs with
which BMI has a reciprocal agreement. The reciprocal agreements that
BMI has entered into with other CROs, however, have a territorial restriction clause, prohibiting BMI from granting global licenses for the
repertoire of these foreign CROs. 2 68 The reciprocal agreement between
BMI and PRS, for example, grants to BMI the exclusive right to license
PRS's repertoire of songs only within the United States. The U.S. webcaster's blanket license from BMI allows the webcaster to transmit
BMI's repertoire, as well as PRS's repertoire, only within the United
States. Again, the webcaster's transmissions are accessed outside of the
United States. Therefore, if the United States webcaster is transmitting
a song from the PRS repertoire, for example "Wonderful Tonight," written by Eric Clapton, the webcaster would be infringing Eric Clapton's
public performance right by transmitting and publicly performing "Wonderful Tonight" into the U.K. where the webcaster does not have a license to publicly perform 'Wonderful Tonight."
The third problem is that the present system of licensing causes the
online music provider to infringe a foreign CRO's exclusive right to license and collect royalties in its territory. BMI, for example, has a territorially restrictive reciprocal agreement with PRS. This agreement
grants to PRS the exclusive right to license and collect royalties for the
public performance of BMI's repertoire in the U.K. When the United
States webcaster transmits a song from BMI's repertoire, for example
"Crazy," into the U.K., it is infringing PRS's exclusive right to license
that song in the U.K. Again, this same scenario plays out in every territory that accesses the webcaster's transmission outside of the United
267. Commission Study, supra note 226, at 11 (stating that reciprocal agreements between rights CROs grants each CRO the exclusive right, within its territory, to license the
repertoire of the other).
268. Email from Alain Andri~s of the E.U. Directorate General for Competition (Apr. 16,
2008, 11:22 a.m. EST) (on file with author).
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States because BMI has a territorially restrictive reciprocal agreement
with each CRO in the world.
For example, GEMA, 26 9 the German CRO, under a rcciprocal agreement with PRS to license the public performance of "Wonderful Tonight"
within Germany, may bring an infringement suit against the United
States webcaster for publicly performing "Wonderful Tonight" within
Germany without a license. Again, this scenario could play out in every
country that has an Internet connection because every CRO that PRS
has a reciprocal agreement with gives that foreign CRO the exclusive
right to license "Wonderful Tonight" within its territory. In order to prevent a possible infringement in the above example on the behalf of Eric
Clapton and to achieve legal certainty, the webcaster must go to GEMA,
the German PRO, and obtain a license to perform "Wonderful Tonight"
in Germany. In this scenario, one would think that the U.S. webcaster
could go directly to PRS to obtain a global license to perform "Wonderful
Tonight" publicly on the Internet. However, PRS cannot grant such a
license because it has already fragmented the performance right for its
repertoire through territorially restrictive agreements with GEMA and
2 70
every other CRO in the world.
The fourth problem that territorially restrictive licensing creates for
online music providers is that when they transmit songs outside of the
territory for which they have a license, they are breaching their contract
(blanket license) with the CRO, which only allowed the repertoire of
songs to be transmitted within the CRO's territory.
Theoretically, the above scenarios are possible. However, there does
not seem to be any case of a CRO suing a foreign webcaster for infringement because the webcaster was streaming into the foreign country
without any licenses from the CRO. In reality, the webcaster would
likely negotiate a license if requested. However, ASCAP suggested that
a webcaster with a license to transmit ASCAP's repertoire in the United
States would not require any other licenses from other CROs. 2 7 1 ASCAP
stated:
All PROs are aware that the Internet is an international business and
anyone world-wide could access content from any Web site. For that
reason, it is usually sufficient for an Internet service to obtain a license
269. Gesellschaft ffir Musikalische Auffifihrungs- und Mechanische Vervielfdltigungsrechte.
270. However, pursuant to the model reciprocal contract agreement of CISAC, the International Confederation of CROs of Authors and Composers, PRS would be restricted in
licensing its own repertoire outside of the United Kingdom. Commission Study, supra note
226, at 11.
271. Email from ASCAP's New Media and Technology Department (Apr. 7, 2008, 5:37
p.m. EST) (on file with author).
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from the country where the music content originates. 2 72 One wonders
then why there is so much talk about multiterritorial licensing and creating legal certainty.
First, ASCAP's reassurance is not that comforting to webcasters
faced with legal uncertainty resulting from the four above-mentioned
scenarios. Corporations want legal certainty. Online companies, especially online start-ups, require capital investment. 2 73 Investors do not
like risk, and where there is legal uncertainty there is risk. Therefore, to
reduce risk, users and online music providers need to make certain that
they reduce legal uncertainty. 2 74 In the world of territorially restrictive
reciprocal agreements, this entails going to each country's CRO and negotiating a license to be able to transmit into that territory. In reality,
webcasters, especially smaller ones, do not have the resources to negotiate licenses with every CRO that oversees the territory that accesses
their transmissions. 2 75 At best, webcasters try to negotiate licenses with
larger CROs and CROs in countries that most heavily access their transmissions. 2 76 Time and resources prohibit creating complete legal cer277
tainty by negotiating a license with each CRO.

D.

WHY Do CROs ADMINISTER ONLINE RIGHTS TERRITORIALLY?

Why do CROs not simply grant each other the right to license their
repertoires multiterritorially? They could, but they do not. 2 78 In fact,
CROs have made it impossible to do so because of the network of reciprocal agreements that they have set up among each other. Due to the territorial restrictions in these agreements, a CRO is unable to grant a
2 79
license for the exploitation of its repertoire outside of its own territory.
CROs base their reciprocal agreements on model agreements created by
the international umbrella organizations CISAC, 2 80 which CROs have
272. Id.
273. Knife Interview, supra note 262.
274. Id.

275. Id.

276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Andri6s Email, supra note 268; Lehman Interview, supra note 46.
279. Andri~s Email, supra note 268.
280. In 1926 the International Confederation of Authors and Composers Societies
("CISAC") was created in Paris to strengthen and develop relations among copyright CROs
of all types, not just music, throughout ''he world. The CISAC was created to adopt technical standards to increase the efficiency and interoperability of the CROs, to improve national and international copyright law and practices, and to retain a central database
allowing CROs to exchange information efficiently. CISAC.org, http://www.cisac.org/Cisac
Portal/afficherArticles.do?menu=main&item=tab2&store=true (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
As of June 2007, 219 CROs from 115 countries were members of CISAC, including BMI and
ASCAP. Id.
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formed to create unity among each type of CRO. 28 1 These model agree-

ments, however, apply a series of restrictions. 28 2 The E.U. Commission
has expressed its view that these agreements, specifically two clauses in
these agreements, constitute restrictive business practices. 28 3 First,
these agreements force rights holders to have the CRO in their territory
manage their rights. 2 84 Second, these agreements force online music
providers to obtain a license only from the CRO in the provider's territory. 28

5

Additionally, these agreements perpetuate the domestic monop-

oly that each of these CROs enjoy and prevents28 6new entities from
entering the market for the management of rights.
These agreements perpetuate a monopoly and are no longer justifiable for the licensing of online music. The present system of licensing
based on reciprocal agreements is inefficient and allows for various hidden administrative costs. 28 7 CROs seem reluctant to change, perhaps
fearing that any system other than their present system of territorially
restrictive licensing that they have used since the 1800s will result in
their demise or, at least a lessening of their monopoly and their revenue.
The CROs' reluctance to change can be seen in their responses to the
recent E.U. "Call for Comments" in which most of the CROs indicated
that they did not want legislation governing the multiterritorial licensing of online music or legislation requiring transparency into their opera281. Community Initiative, supra note 6, at 9. CISAC is the organization for CROs who
administer the public performance right, BIEM (the Bureau International des Soci~t~s
G6rant les Droits d'Enregistrement et de Reproduction M~canique) for CROs who administer the reproduction right, and the Societies' Council for the Collective Management of Performers' Rights ("SCAPR") and Institut pour la tutelle des artistes-interpr~tes et
ex~cutants ("IMAIE") for CROs who administer the performers' rights in musical works.
Id.
282. Press Release, European Commission, Commission market tests commitments
from CISAC and 18 EEA collecting societies concerning reciprocal representation contracts
(June 14, 2007), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
MEMO/06/63&format=HTML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited June
1, 2008) (describing how the Commission issued a Statement of Objections regarding
CISAC's model reciprocal agreement and the actual agreements between societies, which
follow CISAC's model agreement).
283. Press Release, European Commission, Competition: Commission sends Statement
of Objections to the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers
("CISAC") and its EEA members, (Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/63&format=HTML&aged=l&language=EN&gui
Language=en (last visited June 1, 2008).
284. Id.; see also Community Initiative, supra note 6, at 10.
285. Press Release, supra note 283.
286. Id.
287. Lehman Interview, supra note 46. The author could not find any breakdown of
what makes up the administrative costs for CROs on their websites. See infra note 299 for
a discussion of the response that a BMI representative provided in regards to why the
specifics of their administrative fees are kept secret.
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tions. 28 By continuing with their present licensing practices, CROs
hamper and slow the development of new platforms by which legal online music could be sold and distributed to the growing base of Internet
2
users. 89

Why do CROs not grant global licenses for their own repertoires? A
representative from one of the CROs stated that CROs could grant global
licenses. 290 However, CROs supposedly do not grant global licenses because the present system of reciprocal agreements allows local societies
"to monitor local uses and enforce locally." 2 9 1 It is hard to see how the
granting of global licenses would not allow national CROs to monitor and
enforce locally. CROs would be able to grant global licenses to online
music providers residing in their territory and still monitor these providers, enforce locally, and retain a close relationship with their members,
just as they have always done. The only difference would be that, with a
global license, the provider would not have a license that is restricted to
one territory, but would have a global license to transmit music into all
other territories. Perhaps CROs are claiming they will not be able to
monitor the providers in foreign countries who would have a global license for the CROs' national repertoires properly. However, that would
be no different from what presently goes on. BMI, for example, grants a
U.S. webcaster a license to transmit GEMA's repertoire only within the
United States, but the transmission is accessible anywhere in the world
by someone with the Internet. Moreover, GEMA is not monitoring what
the U.S. webcaster is doing. Therefore, the only difference with a global
license would be that the online music providers would have legal
certainty.
Why do CROs not attempt to implement a regime similar to the Santiago Agreement 2 9 2 where CROs enter into reciprocal agreements with
each other, allowing each to grant licenses to online music providers to
transmit the CROs repertoire of songs into the other's territory? Nothing prevents the CROs from entering into such agreements. 2 93 However,
a CRO supposedly "wants to license its own repertoire in its own territory."2 94 This seems to support the idea that CROs are reluctant to
change the present system of territorially restrictive licensing because
they fear losing their monopoly. CROs do not seem to want online music
288. E.U. Commission: Monitoring of the 2005 Music Online Recommendation 9(Feb. 7,
2008), available at, http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/copyright/docs/management/monitoring-report-en.pdf [hereinafter Commission Monitoring].
289. Id.
290. Berenson Email, supra note 264.
291. Id.
292. See Part IX.A. for a discussion of the Santiago Agreement.
293. Berenson Email, supra note 264.
294. Id.
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providers from other countries to transmit music legally, specifically the
CRO's own national repertoire of music, into the CRO's own territory. In
addition, one CRO representative claimed that CROs do not enter into
multiterritorial agreements because a "society has relations with its own
members and wants to service its own members." 2 95 Again, it is hard to
see why this is a valid obstacle to granting a multiterritorial license. If
the CRO in country A grants an online music provider in country A the
right to transmit into country B (pursuant to a reciprocal agreement between A and B to do so), the CRO in country A will still be able to service
its members. The only difference would be that the online music provider in country A now has a license to transmit the repertoire of the
CRO in country A into country B (the repertoire of country A would include the national repertoire of both country A and country B and any
other CRO that was member of the multiterritorial arrangement).
Licensing is big business. ASCAP, for example, collected a record
$863 million dollars in royalties in 2007.296 One possible reason that
CROs do not want to change their present licensing system is a fear that
the royalties they collect will diminish if they are no longer able to maintain their territorial monopolies. BMI and ASCAP, although technically
non-profit organizations, deduct about 13%297 and 11.9%298 for administrative fees, respectively. The CROs are very secretive as to what exactly
the administrative fees cover and what percentage of the administrative
295. Id.
296. ASCAP.com, ASCAP Achieves Outstanding 2007 Financial Performance, http://
www.ascap.com/press/2008/0208_financial.aspx (last visited June 9, 2008).
297. Email from Jean Banks of BMI (June 6, 2008, 1:26 p.m. EST) (on file with author)
(stating that, presently, BMI's administrative fees are under 13%). However, BMI's website states that, in 2001, BMI's administrative fees were 16%. See BMI.com, Where does
your music licensing fee go?, http://www.bmi.comlicensing/ entry/C1282 (last visited Apr.

24, 2008).
298. ASCAP.com, Where Does the Money Go?, http://www.ascap.com/licensing/
licensingfaq.html (last visited May 31, 2008). A representative from ASCAP curiously
claimed and defended the position that ASCAP does not charge administrative fees, but
rather deducts only "overhead costs," which she described as including salaries, policing,
distribution of royalties, etc. Telephone interview with Lynne Enman of ASCAP's Member
Services (May 30, 2008). When asked what the difference is between administrative fees
and "overhead costs" she claimed, "I do not know what administrative fees are because
ASCAP does not charge administrative fees." Id. Her description of "overhead cost" is curiously similar, however, to the definition of "administrative cost," which is an "[elxpense
incurred in controlling and directing an organization, but not directly identifiable with financing, marketing, or production operations. Salaries of senior executives and costs of
general services (such as accounting, contracting, and industrial relations) fall under this
heading." See Businessdictionary.com, 'Administrative Cost' definition, http://www.businessdictionary.com/ definition/administrative-cost.html (last visited May 31, 2008). Perhaps ASCAP believes the term "administrative cost" sounds too self-serving and "overhead
cost" has a more altruistic ring to it. BMI, however, is secure in describing administrative
costs as "administrative costs." Banks Email, supra note 297.
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fees go to each cost. One CRO representative claimed that detailed information about administrative fees was "competitive information" that
must be kept "private and confidential."2 9 9 One expert feels that these
secretive administrative fees could be lowered to about 5%.300 Despite
what may be excessive administrative fees charged by the United States
CROs, it pales in comparison to the fees charged by some European
CROs. In addition to their administrative fees, which are around 1216%,301 many European CROs take another 10% and donate it to a public fund for the performing arts. 30 2 Therefore, rights holders receive
about 75% of the royalties collected. The real injustice, however, befalls
the United States rights holders. BMI and ASCAP, through reciprocal
agreements, collect public performance royalties in the United States for
European repertoires. 30 3 If BMI takes 13% for administrative fees, that
means European songwriters and publishers are receiving 87% of the
total royalties collected by BMI. Compare that to about 25% that many
European CROs deduct from the royalties collected for the performance
of U.S. songs, 10% of which the European CROs deduct and donate to
local European public funds for the arts without the consent of U.S. song30 4
writers and music publishers.
299. Email from Jean Banks of BMI (June 10, 2008, 2:37 p.m. EST) (on file with author) (stating that the "powers that be" at BMI did not want that information to be given
out). One wonders whether keeping such information secret actually gives a CRO a competitive advantage or whether CROs would rather no one find out where all of the administrative fees are going.
300. Lehman Interview, supra note 46.
301. MCPS-PRS-Alliance, What does MPCS charge? (Commission Rates), http://www.
mcps-prs-alliance.co.uk/membership/MCPSroyalties/MCPScommissionrates/Pages/MCPScommissionrates.aspx (last visited June 1, 2008) (stating MCPS-PRS (U.K. CRO) charges
a 12% commission for Internet licenses); SGAE, We manage your rights: Where paid royalties go, http://www.sgae.es/tipology/est/item/ en/526_738.html (last visited June 1, 2008)
(stating SGAE (Spanish CRO) deducts on average 15.6% of royalties for administrative
costs);
SACEM, FAQ: Where does the money collected by SACEMgo?, http://www.
sacem.fr/portailSacem/jsp/ep/ channelView.do?channelId=536882058&channelPage=ACTION%3BBVCONTENT%3B0%3B%2Fep%2FprogramView.do&pageTypeId=536886879#
FAQ1l (last visited June 1, 2008) (stating French CRO deducts 15.48% for administrative
costs).
302. GEMA takes 10% for "social and cultural purposes." GEMA.de, at Accounting Procedures: Ratings, http://www.gema.de/en/members/accounting-procedures/ratings/
(last
visited May 31, 2008); BUMASTERMA, Frequently Asked Questions, How much does
BUMA/STERMA spend on sponsoring and promoting Dutch music?, http://www.bumastemra.nl/en-US/Service/FAQ.htm (last visited June 1, 2008) (suggesting that the 10%
taken out for "social and cultural funds" is pursuant to "international agreements"). A
representative from BUMA stated that 10% is taken out by societies pursuant to an agreement with CISAC. Email from Erik Verzijl, an employee of BUMA (June 12, 2008, 9:46
a.m. EST) (confirming that 10% is taken out of all royalties collected, including those that
belong to U.S. performances).
303. Lehman Interview, supra note 46.
304. Verzijl Email, supra note 302.
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TO GRANT GLOBAL OR

MULTITERRITORIAL LICENSE FOR THEIR MUSICAL
COMPOSITIONS AND RECORDINGS?

The territorial regime does not necessarily mean that cross-border
licensing is unavailable. 30 5 Some CROs have started granting cross-border licenses in addition to the traditional national licenses. 30 6 Such ini30 7
tiatives, however, need to have the consent of the rights holders.
However, one may wonder why rights holders have not urged CROs to
grant global licenses to online users and providers of music instead of
territorially restrictive or even multiterritorial licenses. First, a true
"global" license is likely not possible. If it is possible, it will be preceded
first by a multiterritorial licensing regime. The reason for this is that
the territorially restrictive network of reciprocal agreements that CROs
have created would not make global licensing possible. 30 8 BMI, for example, cannot simply grant to United States online music providers a
global license for its repertoire. Every CRO in the world has an agreement with BMI giving each CRO the exclusive right to license BMI's repertoire within its respective territory. Therefore, BMI must go to each
CRO and renegotiate the territorially restrictive license, creating an
agreement between the two CROs allowing each to grant licenses to
transmit its national repertoire only into the other's territory. 30 9 Otherwise, if BMI granted worldwide rights to U.S. online music providers for
its repertoire, BMI would be violating its restrictive reciprocal agreements with other CROs and United States users would be infringing various rights for reasons already stated.
In regards to musical compositions, the likely answer why songwriters and performers have not required all CROs to begin granting multiterritorial licenses is that they do not know any better. Most
305. International Confederation of Music Publishers, Transcript of Hearing on June
14-16, 2006 4, availableat http://www.icmp-ciem.org/PUBLIC/NewsViews/ICMPCIEMOral
[hereinafter Oral Observations
ObservationsCISACStatementObjections0606l6.pdf

ICMP].
306. Id. at 3.
307. Id.
308. Guilbault, supra note 116, at 2 (discussing how the present system of reciprocal
agreements prohibits any type of global license because of its territorial limitations).
309. For example, GEMA (the German CRO) would negotiate a license with SACEM
(the French CRO). GEMA would agree to allow SACEM to license GEMA's repertoire online to the extent that French online music providers with a blanket license from SACEM
would be allowed to transmit GEMA's repertoire into Germany. Remember, the reciprocal
agreement between SACEM and GEMA has allowed each CRO to license the repertoire of
the other (traditionally only within their respective territories). Conversely, SACEM would
grant GEMA the right to confer blanket licenses to German online music users and providers, which would allow these entities to transmit SACEM's repertoire of French songs into
France.
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songwriters are not lawyers or business people. 3 10 In addition, most
songwriters are not successful enough to change things. Those that are
successful often set up their own publishing companies and license their
own songs. 3 1 1 Moreover, most songwriters have assigned their rights to
their songs over to large music publishing companies. The large music
publishers, who often have agreements with record companies, are not
going to change a situation that is making them a lot of money. As one
person in the industry, who wished to remain nameless, stated in regards to record companies not wanting to change, "[i]t is hard to get
' 3 12
someone to leave a party when their glass is still full of champagne.
The large publishing companies, the CROs, and the large record companies have a certain way of doing things that currently still makes them a
lot of money, although in the long term, their resistance to change will
only hurt the industry by inhibiting the creation of new platforms of music providers.
With regard to sound recordings, the situation is similar. Most performers are not successful enough to change things. The record companies own the sound recordings, not the performers. Successful
performers simply negotiate for themselves a better percentage of the
royalty rates that the record companies receive. In addition, performers
need the large record companies for promotion of their songs and for distribution of their music.
However, the large publishing and record companies are slowly
adapting to the online environment, deciding to bypass the restrictive
licensing regime currently followed by the CROs, and self-administer
and license their rights online. As discussed earlier in this article, rights
holders have the ability to fragment the rights in their copyrighted work.
A record company, for example, may decide to grant online music providers a global or a multiterritorial license for the performance right in its
sound recordings online. However, the record company may still allow
CROs to continue to license the performance right of the company's
sound recordings for terrestrial broadcasts. The record company has
fragmented its performance right to maximize efficiency and profits.
There are an increasing number of examples of the major publishing and
record companies fragmenting their works in this way. For example,
CELAS is a legal entity created to act as a one-stop-shop for licensing
EMI Music Publishing's repertoire for online and mobile uses in forty
European countries. 3 13 Warner/Chappell Music, GEMA, MCPS-PRS,
and the Swedish CRO ("STIM") have teamed up to offer E.U.-wide digital
310. Andri~s Email, supra note 259.
311. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 85, at 222.
312. The source of this quote requested that I not refer to his or her name.
313. Commission Monitoring, supra note 288, at 6. In January of 2008, CELAS signed
its first E.U.-wide licensing end-user arrangement with mobile operator Omnifone. Id.
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licenses for Warner's entire repertoire. 3 14 Universal Music Publishing
Group ("UMPG"), another publishing giant, has signed an agreement
with SACEM that will allow SACEM to administer E.U.-wide licenses
covering the repertoire of UMPG and the repertoire of SACEM that
315
UMPG publishes.
VIII.

SOLUTIONS TO THE TERRITORIALLY RESTRICTIVE
LICENSING OF ONLINE MUSIC
A.

THE POSSIBILITY OF ONE OR ONLY A FEW

CROs

ADMINISTERING A GLOBAL LICENSE

As digital rights management ("DRM") technology and, more importantly, technology that allows tracking of songs, develops and becomes
more accurate, uniform, and financially feasible to implement, it would
be quite possible for there to be only one CRO to administer global licenses for the performance right of music online. Such a CRO could have
branches in each media market, doing essentially the same that individual national rights CROs do. 3 16 A better situation would be several
CROs that administered global licenses. This would add an element of
competition and keep administrative costs down as the CROs continually
developed technology to make tracking and licensing of songs and royalty payments more accurate and more efficient. 3 17 One sees this to a
certain extent in the United States, where BMI and ASCAP, and SESAC
compete for songwriters.
However, some are of the view that one organization for the licensing of the performance right of online music (or even a few organizations
for different regions of the world) would not be practical. 3 18 National
rights organizations, at least in regards to the licensing of performance
rights, may still be indispensable for various reasons. National CROs
may be better able to deal with differences in language. In addition,
3 19
rights owners may prefer to have their rights organizations nearby.
However, as stated above, one, or a few, CROs licensing global online
rights could have satellite offices in each country, performing the very
same function that national CROs presently perform. 3 20 Nevertheless,
there would be many hurdles to creating an international licensing reId. Warner granted these three societies the non-exclusive right to offer such liId. Other societies will be allowed to join at a later date. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
318. COLLECTIVE LICENSING, supra note 201, at 219. This was the view of a member of
the Swedish Music Publisher's Association.
319. Id. at 220.
320. Lehman Interview, supra note 46.
314.
censes.
315.
316.
317.
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gime. The main hurdle would be that countries would refuse or, would
at least be very reluctant to give up their national CRO, granting a nondomestic entity control of the country's national repertoire. A country's
music is, in many respects, a reflection and an expression of that country's culture and heritage. Rights holders may not like the idea of having
a large, international CRO managing their rights. Rights holders may
fear, perhaps rightly so, that a national CRO would offer a more personal
level of service than an international or multiterritorial CRO.
The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") may, at first
glance, seem like a possible candidate to administer global rights for online music. However, this will likely never happen for the same reasons
as stated in the preceding paragraph. In addition, the governments who
are members of the United Nations run WIPO. CROs, especially the
larger ones, have a great deal of influence on their respective governments. 3 2 1 They will not lose their monopoly on the licensing of music to
WIPO. 3 2 2

B.

Music PUBLISHERS AND RECORD COMPANIES MANAGING
THEIR RIGHTS ONLINE

Providers of online music in the United States already deal directly
with the record labels for the licensing of digital phonogram deliveries,
i.e. downloads, of sound recordings and for the public performance right
of the sound recording for digital transmissions. Today, there are four
multinational record companies ("major labels") that control over 90% of
3 23
the physical product (mostly CDs) of recorded music worldwide.
These major labels have managed this through mergers and by affiliating themselves with numerous independent labels (often called "Indie labels"). 32 4 In 2005, these independent labels released 81.6% of the
albums in the world. 3 2 5 The major labels, with which these Indies are

affiliated, have the production capacity and the distribution channels in
place to produce the CDs for these albums and then distribute them.
In 2006, five music publishing companies controlled almost two
thirds of the market share and revenues of the music publishing market. 3 2 6 The music publishing industry, however, has a wide range of

smaller, independent publishers. One can see the vast number of music
publishers by the number that the Harry Fox Agency represents 321. Id.
322. Id.
323. BIEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 706. The four major labels are Warner Music Group,
EMI, Sony/BMG Music, and Universal Music Group. Id.
324. Id. at 707.
325. Id.
326. Id. These five music publishers are EMI, Warner/Chappell, Universal, Sony-ATV,
and BMG. Id.
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28,000.327 The record industry has many independent labels, but these
Indies often affiliate themselves with the four major labels. The main
reason for the difference between the number of independent publishers
and the number of independent record labels is that record companies
need to manufacture and distribute product, i.e. CDs. 3 28 The large record labels are best equipped to do this, having the production capabilities and the distribution channels already in place to distribute CDs to
many people as quickly as possible. 3 29 A publisher, on the other hand,
could market a hit song simply by using a telephone, fax machine, or the
Internet. 330 It would rarely be practical, therefore, for most online music
providers to obtain a global license for the public performance right in
songs by going directly to individual music publishers instead of getting
a blanket license from a CRO.
Another reason why it would be impractical for most online music
providers to seek global licenses from various publishers is fragmentation. Co-authors in songs may choose different music publishers to administer their rights in a musical composition. An online music provider
who did not obtain a license from each music publisher representing
each of the authors in a song would be infringing the rights of the author
whose rights he did not license.
Finally, going directly to music publishers for a worldwide online
public performance right would only be practical for large webcasters.
First, large webcasters can gain the attention of a large publisher by
making it worthwhile for the publisher to negotiate a license. Second,
large webcasters have the financial resources to negotiate such licenses. 3 3 1 Webcasters want as much content as possible to attract a
large audience, which means greater advertising revenues. 33 2 An example of the major labels finally taking advantage of the digital age is their
agreement with Last.fm, which is now owned by the media giant,
CBS. 33 3 The four major record labels, and over 150,000 independent labels, recently entered into an agreement with Last.fm, resulting in over
3.5 million songs being streamed for free. 3 34 Part VII.E. of this Article
describes other platforms that the large publishers and record companies
327. Id.
328. BIEDERMAN, supra note 3, at 706.
329. Id. at 640.
330. Id.
331. Huppe Interview, supra note 105.
332. Id.
333. The Social, On Wednesday, CBS and Last.fm Will Announce... Something, http:ll
news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-9855443-36.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
334. Posting of Eliot Van Buskirk to WIRED Blog Network, http://blog.wired.com/music/2008/01/liveblog-the-cb.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2008). Consumers will be able to listen to a song up to three times for free. Id. Last.fm is hoping to set up deals with iTunes
and other download sites where consumers would have to pay for the fourth time they
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have recently created for multiterritorial or even global licensing of their
repertoires. However, the easiest and most efficient way for most online
music providers, i.e the smaller and medium webcasters, to achieve more
content is through blanket licenses from CROs rather than negotiating
licenses with individual music publishers. 3 35
C.

WILL DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT ALLOW RIGHTS HOLDERS
TO SELF-ADMINISTER THEIR RIGHTS?

There are two basic types of DRM: technological protection measures and technological identification measures. 3 3 6 Technological protection measures are addressed first.
1.

Technological ProtectionMeasures

Technological protection measures ("TPMs") are further divided into
technologies that either protect access to a copyrighted work or control
the ability to copy the work. 3 3 7 An example of a TPM protecting access

to a work is an encryption mechanism on a digital work that prevents
users from accessing the work unless they are authorized users with the
correct "key" to access the content. 338 Technological measures that control use of a work include technologies that would only allow a user to
make a certain number of copies of the work. 3 3 9 These new technologies
allow rights holders to maintain some of the exclusivity in their owner340
ship of their copyrighted works online.
The natural reaction of the music industry is a defensive one when
faced with new technology. The fear has always been that each new
technology that allows for new means for the copying or distribution of
music will be the death knoll of the music industry. The music industry
341
once thought that the Player Piano would destroy the music business.
Then the industry saw cassette tapes as being the downfall of the industry. 34 2 The movie industry also fears new technology. For example, Jack
Valenti, the former president of the Motion Picture Association of
listen to a song. Id. In addition, the consumer can use the expired songs to create a customized Internet radio station. Id.
335. Id.
336. Music UNLEASHED: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF MOBILE Music DISTRIBUTION 140-41
(Rolf Auf der Maur & Marc Jacobson eds. 2004).
337. Id. at 142.
338. Id.
339. See id. at 143 (discussing the Serial Copyright Management System in the United
States, which was part of the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992).
340. Id. at 155.
341. PRACTICING L. INST., MusIc ON THE INTERNET: UNDERSTANDING THE NEW RIGHTS &
SOLVING NEW PROBLEMS 345 (vol. 1 2001) [hereinafter Music ON THE INTERNET].
342. David Salvator, Which Online Music Service is Best, http://www.extremetech.com/
article2/0,1558,1784304,00.asp (last visited Apr. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Extremetech].
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America graphically said, "[t]he VCR is to the movie industry as the Boston Strangler was to a woman alone. '3 4 3 This fear of change caused the
industry to wait ten years before providing a legal alternative to illegal
peer-to-peer file sharing networks. 3 4 4 The record companies and the music industry in general, are slowly beginning to realize that the future of
music is online and with digital transmissions in general. The sooner
the industry whole-heartedly embraces this fact, the sooner it will be
able to allow rights holders to reap the financial rewards of digital music
distribution by providing legal alternatives that provide consumers with
what they desire - variety in the selection of music, low cost, and the
ability to play purchased downloads of music on various devices.
Instead of a purely defensive approach to licensing music online, a
balance must be struck between rights holders' ability to effectively protect their works from unauthorized use and the ability of consumers to
lawfully obtain and use copyrighted works. If rights holders make access
to copyrighted works too difficult or if subsequent use by purchasers of
the works is too limited, consumers will find illegal ways to obtain a
wider variety of works that are more user-friendly. For example, protection measures should not prevent a consumer from downloading a song
and being able to transfer the song to a multitude of devices or mediums,
such as an MP3 player, iPod, computer, or CD.
The E.U. Commission has recognized the need for more effective use
of DRM systems. The Commission released a Directive that called for
more cooperation between rights holders and industrialists to allow for
effective TPMs and the normal operation of electronic equipment that
has a "commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent
the technical protection." 3 4 5 Rights holders and CROs must embrace the
Internet and the myriad of possibilities that it offers for selling and distributing music. When consumers access the Internet for digital music,
346
legally or illegally, they do so primarily because of variety, not price.
Rights holders and CROs must come to realize that the best course of
action is to maximize lawful, legitimate uses, instead of minimizing unlawful uses. 3 4 7 Attempts to limit access to music or use of downloaded
songs are unpopular and often lead consumers to circumvent protection
measures 348 or to seek out illegal ways to get a variety of music that is
easily transferable. Effective use of DRM systems will allow CROs to
streamline the tracking, management, and collection and distribution of
343. MusIc ON

THE INTERNET, supra note 341, at 345.
344. Salvator, supra note 342.
345. Music UNLEASHED, supra note 336, at 153.

346. IFPI:07 Digital Music Report, at 15, available at, http://www.ifpi.org/contentlibrary/digital-music-report-2007.pdf.
347. COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 88.
348. Id. at xxii.
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royalties, increasing accuracy and reducing administrative costs. 3 49
However, perhaps the best solution is to eliminate TPMs completely.
Apple, for example, must distribute music with DRM, specifically TPMs,
that restricts the consumer to playing the purchased song only on certain
devices. 3 50 This is because the record companies, specifically the four
largest, require Apple to place DRM systems on their sound recordings
that Apple sells online. 35 1 However, Steve Jobs, CEO of Apple, stated
35 2
that a DRM-free world is the best alternative for the music industry
and noted, "DRM systems haven't worked and may never work, to halt
music piracy. '3 53 The reason is quite ironic. Ninety percent of the songs
sold by record companies are songs on CDs, which have absolutely no
DRM because the CDs must play in CD players that support no DRM
system. 35 4 Of course, this allows consumers to play these DRM-free
songs on any player or computer. More importantly, however, DRM-free
CDs allow consumers to upload DRM-free songs onto their computers
where they can illegally distribute the songs on the Internet 3 5 5 via peerto-peer file sharing services such as LimeWire. If 90% of the songs sold
have no DRM systems, then why force the remaining 10%, which consists of legally downloaded online music, to have DRM systems? 35 6 Dispensing

with

DRM

would

not

significantly

hurt

CD

sales. 35 7

Furthermore, dispensing with DRM would encourage new companies to
invest in new online stores and music players because they would not be
burdened with the cost of implementing and updating a DRM system
358
that a tech-savvy person quickly finds a way to bypass.
2. DRM Identification Technology
TPMs allow rights holders to protect and control the use of their
works online, but how will individual rights holders track the usage of
their works? The answer is with DRM identification technology. An example of a technological identification measure is the Rights Manage349. Community Initiative, supra note 6, at 14.

350. Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsornusic/
(last visited May 1, 2008) [hereinafter Apple]. The DRM allows consumers to play a
downloaded iTunes on up to five computers and an unlimited number of iPods. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Apple, supra note 350.
357. Id.
358. Id.
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ment Information System ("RMI"). 3 59 CISAC, in collaboration with its
member CROs and the International Standard Organization ("ISO") has
developed the RMI system for the Internet. 3 60 CISAC touts RMI as
something that will revolutionize how works are identified and licensed
as well as how royalties are collected and distributed. 36 1 RMI refers to
all of the data and international standards used to identify a creative
work and the rights holders of the work. 3 62 For example, there is the
International Standard Name Identifier ("ISNI"), which is used to identify, in multiple databases, the parties connected with a work. 3 63 In addition, this standard will allow CROs and third parties to exchange
information regarding the work. 3 64 There is also a specific ISO identifier
for musical works called the International Standard Musical Work Code
("ISWC"). 3 6 5 An ISWC can be assigned to any musical creation and provides information about that musical creation, including title, composer,
366
author, or arrangers.
The ISWC International Agency ("Agency"), was appointed by the
3 67
ISO appointed to be the registration authority for the ISWC standard.
An ISWC will only identify the musical composition in a work. It will not
identify the sound recording in a musical work. 368 Recognized member
agencies of the Agency allocate unique ISWCs. 3 6 9 Agencies attach an
ISWC to a song only after gathering certain identifying information
about that song 370 The Agency believes that within a maximum of two
years, the ISWC system will cover almost the entire world repertoire of
music. 3 7 1 An ISWC will permanently remain with a work that as it is
transmitted digitally, allowing rights holders or CROs to accurately
359. Email from Erik Verzijl, an employee of BUMA (June 8, 2008, 9:05 a.m. EST) (on
file with author) (stating that BUMA uses a new technology called fingerprinting to track
songs used for radio and television).
360. CISAC.org., Managing Rights in a Digital World, http://www.cisac.org/CisacPortal/
listeArticle.do?numArticle=851&method=afficherArticleInPortlet (last visited Apr. 18,
2008).
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. CISAC.org., Identifiers: The Nuts and Bolts of RMI, http://www.cisac.org/
CisacPortalliste Article.donumArticle=852&method=afficherArticleInPortlet (last visited
Apr. 18, 2008).
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. ISWC.org, http://www.iswc.org/en/html/Home.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
368. ISWC.org, FAQ, http://www.iswc.org/en/htmliFAQA.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2008).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. ISWC.org, http://www.iswc.org/en/html/Home.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
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identify that work wherever it is transmitted, regardless of how often. 3 72
What is unique about an ISWC is that it will allow for the tracking and
exchange of information regarding the musical works for such things as
37 3
registration, identification, and royalty distribution.
These new tracking technologies are very useful for copyright clearance in the digital environment because they allow users to identify the
rights holders in the work and the rights that they will need to license
before they can exploit the work. 3 7 4 Such technology will be especially
helpful in the area of multimedia works that contain numerous rights for
the video and music portions of the work the user must clear before the
work can be exploited. 3 75 With these new technologies, commercial entities could offer services to publishers that provided for DRM of the pub376
lishers' works on the Internet, thus displacing the CROs.
On the other hand, it will likely prove difficult for rights holders to
manage their rights individually until CROs "unbundle" the rights that
many of them control. 3 7 7 Many CROs control various rights, unlike in
the United States where organizations such as BMI and ASCAP control
only the performance right. Aside from the agreements between rights
holders and the CROs in the United States, most agreements between
rights holders and CROs allowing CROs to manage various rights (a
"bundle" of rights) do not allow rights holders the option to later decide
to manage some of these rights on their own.3 78 Unbundling would allow rights holders the flexibility to manage some rights on their own and
379
to allow CROs to manage other rights.
With the ISWC standard for identifying and tracking the musical
composition in a work, technological measures exist which allow for the
precise tracking of digitally transmitted music. Once the world repertoire of music is digitized and tagged with tracking standards, such as
the ISWC standard, it will become difficult for CROs to claim that blan372. ISWC.org, FAQ, http://www.iswc.org/en/html/FAQA.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2008).
373. Id.
374. COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 88, at 23; Music

UNLEASHED,

supra note

336, at 156.
375. COLLECTIVE

MANAGEMENT,

supra note 88, at 25.

376. Id. at 22.
377. Ungerer, supra note 257, at 8.
378. Id. In the United States, the court-ordered consent decrees that govern the agreements into which ASCAP and BMI enter allow rights holders the freedom to manage some
of the rights associated with their musical works.
379. Id. at 8-9. The option for individual rights holders to use DRM systems to manage
their rights must be allowed, providing individual rights holders the option of individual
rights management or collective management of their rights. Id. at 10. Unbundling of
rights will likely be a major topic in the near future. Id. at 9.
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ket licensing is indispensable. 38 0 Setting reasonable fees for a blanket
license "is perplexing in theory, impractical in practice, and dubious in
outcome ."381 The CROs claim that a per-song royalty rate would increase administrative fees and be impractical. 38 2 However, some think
this is simply not true 38 3 and that CROs, like ASCAP and BMI, are simply not taking advantage of new technologies that would allow CROs to
compensate each rights holder for the actual number of times their songs
are played. 38 4 The present algorithms and methods of royalty computations, some claim, only benefit popular songs and neglects to compensate
38 5
lesser-played songs.
Alternatively, rights holders may be able to manage the use of their
works in the digital environment through use of CISAC's RMI. 38 6 By
doing so, the individual user would keep the administrative fees taken
out of their royalties by the CROs and increase the efficiency of the licensing process. 38 7 Individual songwriters would likely still need the
backing of a publisher with the finances and the know-how to promote
songs and the ability to get record companies to record their songs. However, large publishers and record companies, who control the rights to
millions of songs, have already begun to license their online rights directly, circumventing the CROs. 38 8 In addition, large music publishers
may not find it worthwhile to negotiate licenses with small or new online
providers and, small or new providers may not have the financial resources to negotiate these licenses. In such instances, it is more practical
that CROs continue to act as a clearing house of rights for online music.
It would be even more unlikely for an individual performer or band
to manage their rights in a sound recording. There are now tens of
thousands of singers and bands on MySpace and YouTube, hoping for
their big break. The creation of a "demo tape" has become much easier
and less costly to make with computers, new recording technology, and
380. Boiron, supra note 257, at 7.
381. U.S. v. ASCAP, 831 F. Supp. 137, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
382. Enman, supra note 298.
383. Lehman Interview, supra note 46.
384. See Shadoshea.com, The Ugly Truth About BMI and ASCAP, http://www.
shadoshea.com/services /royalties/index.php3 (last visited Apr. 25, 2008) (claiming that ASCAP and BMI use an antiquated method of calculating royalties that fails to pay many, if
not most, less commercially successful performers for the public performances of their
songs; arguing that the present system of calculating royalties needs to be replaced with
one that uses new tracking technology that would allow all performers to be paid for actual
usage of their songs).
385. Id.
386. COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 88, at 23.
387. Assessment, supra note 207, at 11.
388. See Part IX.B. supra for a description of some of the platforms and multiterritorial
licensing systems record companies and music publishers have recently created.
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song software. Although performers may not need expensive studio time
to create a decent sound recording, they still require record companies
for another reason - promotion. 38 9 If a singer or band is "discovered" on
MySpace, for example, how will they sell their music? There is likely
technology that allows performers to sell songs through a website. However, they will likely not become a national or international star, selling
millions of records or downloads, without the backing of a large record
label that will spend millions of dollars promoting the artist and their
record.
Finally, even though new technology has provided the means for
more efficient rights management, the Internet and digital media have
created so many possibilities as to the manner and types of use that collective management of online rights may perhaps still be the best
method. 3 90 At any rate, it seems that the technology is not yet advanced
enough to allow individual rights holders to manage, promote, and license their works online. Until that happens, or to maintain their viability when it does, CROs will have to coordinate and integrate their use of
electronic management to best serve rights holders and online music
39 1
providers.
One way that the new tracking technology will help collective CROs
is in royalty collection. Royalties are often delayed because of inaccurate
information or lack of information as to who should receive the royalty
payments. 3 9 2 For example, BMI may receive royalty payments from foreign affiliates for a specific songwriter, composer, or publisher. 3 9 3 However, foreign affiliates often provide only the title of the musical work,
which causes BMI to do extensive research to determine who the entitled
parties are and how much they should receive. 3 9 4 Another problem with
tracking songs and correctly distributing royalty payments results when
foreign providers or distributors of music translate the title of a song into
their own language. 39 5 Having a universal tracking standard, such as
the ISWC, on every digital copy of a song would solve this problem, too.

389. Knife Interview, supra note 262.
390. Music UNLEASHED, supra note 336, at 155.
391. Id. For example, new technology will allow CROs to outsource some of their management services to specialists in order to reduce costs. Assessment, supra note 207, at 11
n. 20.
392. BMI, BMI Royalty Information, at 2, http://www.bmi.com/brochures/royalty.pdf
(last visited July 22, 2008) [hereinafter BMI Royalty].
393. Id. at 13.
394. Id.
395. Id.
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CRO

Rights holders and CROs in the United States have proposed legislation to create a statutory blanket license to cover performance, reproduction, and distribution rights. 3 9 6 However, this proposal failed. 3 9 7 A
unilicense will likely be the future of licensing rights holders' rights online. 3 98 As one industry representative suggested, each country would
have one CRO that licensed a unilicense for the public performance, reproduction, and distribution of works in the digital and online environments. 3 9 9 For example, in the United States, the Harry Fox Agency
(licensing the mechanical right, i.e. reproduction and distribution), ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC (all three licensing the public performance right)
would no longer directly license mechanical and public performance
rights for online music. The new CRO would grant unilicenses covering
all three of these rights and collect the resulting royalties. 40 0 The new
CRO would then distribute to the individual CROs the percentage they
are owed, which the individual CROs would then distribute to their
members.401
Ideally, however, the new CRO granting the unilicense would cut
the individual CROs out of the equation altogether. In such a scenario,
the new CRO would grant the unilicense, collect the royalties, and distribute the royalties directly to the appropriate songwriters, publishers,
performers, and record companies. This would cut down on the administrative fees that the individual CROs would have deducted from the royalties (the new CRO having already deducted its administrative fees),
giving rights holders more money. Further maximization of royalties
could be achieved by having only one or only a few CROs in the world
granting a unilicense. 40 2 If fewer CROs handle the royalties, then less
396. Glaser, supra note 180; see also Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, 110th Cong. (2005) (statement of Irwin Z. Robinson, Chairman and CEO of Famous Music Publishing and Chairman
of the Board of the National Music Publishers' Association), available at, http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1566&wit-id=4453 (describing their proposal for a
"unilicense").
397. Knife Interview, supra note 182.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. For example, if it is determined that 35% of the unilicense royalties were for
the public performance of BMI's repertoire, then the new CRO would give BMI 35% of the
collected royalties, which BMI would distribute (after taking out an administrative fee) to
its affiliate songwriters and publishers.
402. Email from Bruce Lehman, Senior Counsel at Akin Gump in Washington D.C. and
former Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, (Apr. 18, 2008, 5:51 p.m. EST) (on file with author). The fewer CROs that
handle the royalties, the fewer administrative fees charged, resulting in more royalties for
rights holders. Id.
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administrative fees are deducted and the more royalties rights holders
will see. However, a prerequisite of going beyond the scenario of one new
CRO in each country granting a unilicense for various rights within that
country is that the unilicense must be granted on a multiterritorial basis. The unilicense will make it more efficient for online music providers
to clear rights in musical works within each country. However, if the
unilicense is territorially restrictive and not multiterritorial, then the
same legal uncertainty issues will remain for online music providers.
E.

MULTITERRITORLAL LICENSING

1. Would Competition Between CROs Hurt Rights Holders?
Competition among CROs resulting from a multiterritorial licensing
regime would not necessarily hurt rights holders. 40 3 To a certain extent,
there is competition in the United States between BMI, ASCAP, and SESAC as they compete for rights holders to represent. However, the
United States is unique in this regard. Most, if not all, countries only
have one CRO that administers public performance rights. In addition,
rights holders currently do not have the option to choose a CRO outside
of the place of their economic residence because the reciprocal agreements between the CROs only allow CROs to license the rights of rights
holders within their respective territories. Rights holders, if allowed to
choose the CRO that administered their online rights, would likely go to
the society that gives them the largest royalty distribution.
Therefore, competition would not hurt rights holders by reducing
royalty distribution. Competition, rather, would force the CROs to become more efficient and transparent. 40 4 Competition would also force
CROs to reduce their administrative costs and increase royalty distributions 40 5 in order to keep their members from going to another CRO. In
addition, the CRO with the best service and highest royalty distribution
would be able to attract more members. CROs that are the sole CRO in a
country, therefore, do not want competition because they would then be
forced to provide their members a higher percentage of the royalties, i.e.
reduce their administration costs, in order to keep members or attract
new members. 40 6 In a multiterritorial licensing regime or a global li403. Email from Bruce Lehman, Senior Counsel at Akin Gump in Washington D.C. and
former Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (Apr. 18, 2008, 6:06 p.m. EST) (on file with author).
404. Commission Study, supra note 226, at 37. The E.U. Commission also stated that
competition between CROs for rights holders would be "helpful in creating more efficient
management of the online forms of copyright exploitation." Id. at 55.
405. Id. at 56 (stating that competition between CROs for rights holders would "be a
powerful incentive for collecting societies to provide optimal services to all its right-holders,
irrespective of their location - thereby enhancing cross-border royalty payments.").
406. Lehman Email, supra note 403.
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censing regime, this fear is even more pronounced.
CROs fear that a multiterritorial licensing regime that allows rights
holders and online providers of music to choose any CRO with which to
deal, will lead to a "race to the bottom" ' 40 7 in regards to royalties. However, this will likely not happen if the multiterritorial licensing regime
allows member CROs the option to forbid another member CRO from
licensing their repertoire later if that other member was undercutting
rates for the multiterritorial license. In other words, before a race to the
bottom happens, CROs will prohibit those CROs who are undercutting
the prices (likely smaller CROs who are trying to attract online music
providers) from using their repertoires, essentially making the undercutting CROs irrelevant. 40 8 For example, if CRO A, who was a member of a
multiterritorial licensing regime, began to undercut licensing fees by
charging a lower rate for the multiterritorial license, the other CROs,
whose repertoires CRO A was licensing as part of the multiterritorial
license at the reduced rate, could forbid CRO A from further licensing
their repertoires. Without the ability to grant a multiterritorial license
that included all or even some of the other major CROs' repertoires, online music providers would no longer seek a multiterritorial license from
CRO A.
Rights holders may also indirectly prevent a race to the bottom. As
a result of the reciprocal agreements that the CROs currently operate
under, rights holders in country A, for example, must have the CRO in
country A manage their rights. However, if rights holders in country A
had the option under a multiterritorial licensing regime to allow any
CRO that was a member of the multiterritorial licensing regime to manage their rights, the rights holders would take their musical compositions or recordings to the CRO that offered the highest royalty payments.
Therefore, if the CRO in country A, in order to attract online music providers, began reducing royalty rates instead of, or in addition to, reducing
its administrative fees, rights holders in country A would no longer allow
the CRO in country A to administer their rights. Instead, rights holders
in country A would likely seek out another CRO that charged licensees
higher rates resulting in higher royalties for the rights holders. The result would be a loss of rights holders for the CRO in country A, which
would mean a smaller repertoire for the CRO of country A. Faced with a
407. Berenson Email, supra note 169. The fear is that one member CRO of a multiterritorial licensing regime may reduce the royalties it charges for a multiterritorial license
for online music to attract a greater number of online music providers. Other CROs in the
licensing regime, in order to grant licenses and collect royalties would have to charge the
same rate or a lower rate. The one member CRO could then lower its rates again, causing
the other CROs to match or lower their rates. This back and forth lowering of rates in
order to attract licensees, i.e. online music providers, is called a "race to the bottom."
408. Community Initiative, supra note 6, at 46.
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loss of rights holders and licensing revenue, under-cutting royalty rates
would not be an attractive option for the CRO in country A.
2.

Reasons Why a MultiterritorialLicense for Online Music is Needed

In addition to the legal uncertainty issues mentioned in Part VII.C.,
which are a direct result of the present system of territorially restrictive
licensing, there are a couple of other problems resulting in legal uncertainty that a multiterritorial license would alleviate. One problem has to
do with fragmentation of rights. A copyright in a song consists of many
different rights that the rights holder can either assign or license based
on geographical restrictions, restrictions on the type of media used, duration of the rights, etc. Taking a previous example, the U.K. music publisher who owns the rights to 'Wonderful Tonight" may have assigned or
licensed the right to license the public performance of 'Vonderful Tonight" in Germany to a German subpublisher. Therefore, when a United
States webcaster transmits "Wonderful Tonight" into Germany, the German subpublisher may sue the United States webcaster for infringing its
right to license "Wonderful Tonight" in Germany. To prevent legal uncertainty, the United States webcaster would be required to obtain licenses from the CRO in each territory into which the webcaster's
transmission is accessible in order to make certain that it is not infringing the right of an individual or entity that may have one of the fragmented rights in the musical composition or sound recording. As
mentioned before, however, negotiating licenses in each territory to create legal certainty is an expensive and time-consuming process.
In addition, sovereignty poses a potential problem for the cross-border transmission of music. Sovereignty is defined as the "supreme authority within a territory." 40 9 The principle of territoriality is an
element of sovereignty in that a country's sovereignty is defined by and
encompasses the territory within its borders. 4 10 Based on sovereignty
and the principle of territoriality, sovereigns have the authority to regulate anything within their territory, including digital transmissions, into
their territory. Again, this potential problem results in more legal uncertainty. In reality, countries have attempted to regulate and control
transmissions entering and exiting their territories to little avail. 4 1 1 A
multiterritorial license would provide music providers authority to
transmit into countries covered by the multiterritorial license and create
409. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sovereignty, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2008).
410. Id.
411. See David R. Johnson and David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. R. 1367 (2006) (describing the affect of the Internet on the concept
of sovereignty).
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legal certainty that a sovereign will not charge an online music provider
fees or make attempts to shut the provider down.
The primary reason that a multiterritorial license is needed is to create legal certainty for online music providers. The present territorially
restrictive system of copyright licensing and management is inefficient
and incompatible with the offering of music online. The limited licensing
of music by CROs exists because the CROs have not obtained the right to
license the foreign repertoire through a direct relationship with the actual rights holders. 4 12 Instead, CROs have obtained the right to license
music through territorially restrictive reciprocal agreements with other
CROs.

4 13

Another reason, unrelated to legal certainty, why there needs to be a
multiterritorial license is to provide the type of environment that allows
music providers to create new methods of distributing music legally to
consumers across the world. The present territorial system hinders the
development and dissemination of new platforms of music services. The
complexity and tedious nature of clearing rights in many different territories often delays the launching of new services. For example, Apple
introduced its iTunes online music store in a staggered, piecemeal manner in Europe because it had to negotiate clearances of rights with every
4 14
single country in the E.U.
There have been a few attempts at multiterritorial licensing of online music. Not surprisingly, CROs within the E.U. have initiated all of
the attempts. The E.U., through various treaties, has sought to create a
common, open market. 4 15 The goal of the E.U. is to create competition
by eliminating any agreement or activity that is restrictive to the free
movement of goods and services. Two of the multiterritorial licensing
agreements failed and one was renewed. Each agreement covered a different right - public performance, mechanical (i.e. reproduction and distribution), and simulcasting.
412. Assessment, supra note 207, at 6.
413. Id.
414.

Ltider, supra note 7, at 46 n. 200. This service was launched on 28 April 2003 in

the all of the U.S. Id. There was no single launch date for the European Union in 2003.
Instead, the service was introduced over a year later in the United Kingdom, Germany and
France on 15 June 2004. Id. Consumers in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain,
Italy, Portugal, Finland, Austria and Greece had to wait until 26 October 2004. Id. In
Denmark, Norway and Sweden the service only became available on 10 May 2005-over
two years after the U.S. launch date. Id. It appears that iTunes is still not available in
some of the 10 States that joined the Community in May 2004, such as Slovenia, the Slovak
Republic, Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic. Id.
415. See Europa.eu, Summaries of legislation, Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/eec-en.htm (last visited June 10,
2008) (providing a history of the European Economic Community).
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3. Attempts at MultiterritorialLicensing
i. IFPI Simulcasting Agreement for the MultiterritorialLicensing of
the Performance Right in Sound Recordings
On November 16, 2000, the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry ("IFPI"), which represents the record industry worldwide, 4 1 6 applied to the E.U. Commission for a negative clearance, i.e. an
exemption, under Article 81(3)417 of the European Economic Community
Treaty with respect to a simulcasting agreement ("Simulcasting Agreement"). 4 18 Through this Simulcasting Agreement, CROs representing
record labels from around the world came together to offer a multiterritorial, multirepertoire license for the public performance of sound recordings used in simulcasts. 4 19 Each CRO who was a member of the
416. IFPI.org, http://www.ifpi.org/content/sectionabout/index.html (last visited Apr.
18, 2008).
417. See Commission Decision COMP/C238.014, Relating to a Proceeding Under Article
81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, 2002/XXX/EC 2, available at,
http://www.aepo.org/usr/docs ifpi/Commission decision simulcasting.pdf [hereinafter Simulcasting Decision]. Article 81(1) of the European Community ("E.C.") Treaty (the Treaty
of Rome that established the European Economic Community) prohibits anticompetitive
agreements and is as follows:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 81, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. C 325, p. 64-65,
available at, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E081:
EN:HTML. Article 81(3) contains exceptions to Article 81(1):
The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case
of:
any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,
any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of
the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect
of a substantial part of the products in question. Id.
418. Id. at 3.
419. Id. at 3-5.
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Simulcasting Agreement entered into a bilateral agreement with every
other member CRO, granting each other the non-exclusive right to offer
a license to simulcast into each other's territory. 420 Royalties for the
multiterritorial license are calculated according to the destination principle, i.e. the place where the transmission is received. 4 2 1 Therefore, in
calculating royalties for the multiterritorial license, each member CRO
will take into account the individual tariffs of the other member
CROs. 4 2 2 The E.U. Commission had its reservations about this method,
believing that this method could hamper competition by limiting the independence each society had in setting the royalty rates for the multiterritorial license. 4 2 3 However, the Simulcasting Agreement still provided
for some competition by allowing online music providers to negotiate the
4 24
commercial terms of the contract with the CROs.
On June 21, 2001, the IFPI submitted an amended version of the
Simulcasting Agreement. 4 2 5 The amendment allowed simulcasters located in the territory of a CRO that was a member of the Simulcasting
Agreement to obtain a multiterritorial simulcasting license from any
other member CRO. 4 26 This clause was the key difference between the
Simulcasting Agreement and the Santiago Agreement, which covered
the performance right, and was ultimately the reason why the E.U. Commission decided that the Simulcasting Agreement was allowable under
Article 81 of the E.C. Treaty. 4 2 7 The clause meant that any broadcaster
whose signal originated in the territory of any of the members of the
Agreement could obtain a multiterritorial license from any of the CROs
4 28
who were members of the Agreement.
On May 22, 2002, the IFPI again amended the Simulcasting Agreement to require that member CROs specify which part of the tariff
charged by CROs consisted of the CRO's administration fee. 4 2 9 Ultimately, the E.U. Commission authorized an exemption for the Simulcasting Agreement, concluding that the Agreement fulfilled the Article
4 30
81(3) conditions.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Guibault, supra note 116, at 6.
Simulcasting Decision, supra note 417, at 9.
Id. at 4; Simulcasting Decision, supra note 417, at 2.
Guibault, supra note 116, at 4-5.
Assessment, supra note 225, at 9.
Simulcasting Decision, supra note 417, at 8.
Id. at 2.

430. Id. at 31.

20081

THE FUTURE OF LICENSING MUSIC ONLINE

473

ii. The Santiago Agreement - MultiterritorialLicensing Regime for
the Songwriter's PerformanceRight
Five CROs started the Santiago Agreement: BMI, BUMA (Netherlands), GEMA (Germany), PRS (United Kingdom), and SACEM
(France). 4 3 1 The Santiago Agreement was an attempt by these five
432
CROs, and the twenty-one that joined before the Agreement expired,
to create a multiterritorial licensing regime for the public performance
right of songwriters and publishers. 4 3 3 Each of the member CROs was
free to enter into a bilateral agreement with any other member of the
agreement that they chose. 4 3 4 Through these bilateral agreements, each
CRO (e.g. CRO X) agreed to grant to every other CRO with which it had
made an agreement, the nonexclusive right to transmit its (CRO X's) national repertoire into its (CRO X's) territory. 4 3 5 For example, the CRO of
country A would enter into a bilateral agreement with the CRO of country B, which would give the CRO of country B the nonexclusive right to
transmit the national repertoire of country A into the territory of country
A, and vice versa. Ideally, each CRO would enter into a bilateral agreement with every other CRO, providing users with the broadest license
possible. CROs were to apply the tariff in the country of the destination
of the download, if there was any tariff.4 3 6 The Santiago Agreement ex-

pired before the societies and the Commission came to an understanding
437
on the tariff to be charged.
The Santiago Agreement expired in 2004 because the CROs did not
want to allow content providers the ability to obtain a multiterritorial
license from any member CRO the provider chose. 4 38 This "economic
residence" provision of the Santiago Agreement required that users and
providers of online music with an economic residence in the territory of a
member CRO obtain a multiterritorial license from that CRO. In other
words, online music providers could not shop around. This created a de
facto monopoly for CROs over online multiterritorial music licenses in
their own territory, negating any possibility of competition as to licensing terms or administration fees. 4 39 Users of music and online providers
431. COLLECTIVE

MANAGEMENT,

supra note 88, at 13 n. 24. ASCAP did not join, fearing

antitrust issues with the E.U. Directorate General, which is what ultimately happened.
Mosenkis Interview, supra note 217. BMI eventually left for undisclosed reasons, before
expiration of the Agreement.
432. Telephone Interview with Marvin Berenson, General Counsel for BMI (Feb. 25,
2008).
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 88, at 13-14 n. 24 (citation omitted).
437. Berenson Email, supra note 264.
438. Assessment, supra note 207, at 9.
439. Guibault, supra note 116, at 8.
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of music complained about this provision. 4 40 This provision risked the
development of online music services and technology and likely would
have been harmful to rights holders. 4 4 1 The E.U. Commission's Directorate General of Competition investigated and concluded that the "economic residence" provision was anticompetitive. 44 2 The solution was to
allow online music providers to obtain a multiterritorial license from any
CRO that was a member of the Santiago licensing regime. The CROs,
however, feared that there would be a "race to the bottom," i.e. one CRO
would undercut prices to attract online music providers, forcing other
CROs to do the same. 4 4 3 The Commission, however, said that there
would not be competition for online music providers, but rather, there
4 44
would be competition for songwriters and publishers.
Some of the larger CROs then worked on a Recommendation with
the Commission that would amend the Agreement to have CROs compet4 45
ing for product, i.e. songwriters and publishers, rather than users.
The Commission was in agreement with the proposal. However, there
was still a host of other issues, such as transparency in calculating rates,
that the Commission still required answers to. 4 4 6 The smaller CROs
also feared that they would become obsolete. They believed that the
large CROs would dominate the licensing regime, deciding the percentage of royalties owed to each society, which the smaller societies feared
would result in a very small percentage for them. Ultimately, these issues were not resolved and the Agreement expired.
The main issue, however, was the economic residence provision.
CROs claim that their songwriters and publisher members are served
best if the provider who is using their music is in close proximity to
them, the CRO. 4 4 7 The CROs did not want to amend the economic residence provision to allow users with economic residence in any of the
440. Paul Meller, EU Hearingon Online Song Rights, INT'L HERALD TRIB. Nov. 16, 2004,
at XX, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/11/16/music-ed3_.php.
441. Guibault, supra note 116, at 8 (citation omitted). The Santiago Agreement also
required each subsidiary of a multinational corporation that provides online music, which
is located in a different country to be licensed separately, regardless of where the corporation's website is hosted or distributed from. Id. at 9. This meant that each subsidiary must
obtain a separate license from the CRO in the territory in which the subsidiary company is
located. Id.
442. Council Regulation in Cases COMP/C2/39152 - BUMA and COMP/C2/39151
SABAM (Santiago Agreement - COMP/C2/38126), (EC) No 1/2003 of 17 Aug. 2005, 0. J. C
200, 11 - 0012, T 6 and 7, available at, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUri
Serv.do?uri=CELEX:52005XC0817(03):EN:HTML.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Assessment, supra note 207, at 9.
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member states to obtain a license from any member CRO. 448 The CROs
argue that they cannot properly enforce their members' rights and collect
449
license fees and royalties if music providers are in different countries.
The BIEM/Barcelona Agreement provided for a multiterritorial license for an author's online reproduction rights that covered webcasting,
on demand, streamed transmissions, and downloading. 45 0 The Agreement expired in 2004 for the same reason that the Santiago Agreement
451
was not renewed.
IX.

FUTURE OF MULTITERRITORIAL LICENSING

It is possible for CROs to enter into reciprocal agreements with each
other that would allow each CRO to grant licenses permitting online music providers to transmit the repertoire of one CRO into the territory of
the other. However, the present system of territorially restrictive reciprocal agreements limits transmissions, legally speaking, to only one territory. Songwriters, publishers, and record companies are the rights
holders, not the CROs. As the rights holders, they may determine how
many territories in which to license their rights. 4 5 2 The principle of territoriality only determines which law applies to the use or exploitation of
the work. 4 5 3 Therefore, although rights to musical compositions are licensed on a territorial basis, there is no legal requirement that they
must be. 4 5 4 One would think that the rights holders would eventually
assert their rights and break away from the inefficient and inapplicable
system of territorial licensing for purposes of transmitting music online.
However, most individual songwriters and performers need music publishers, record companies and CROs to fund their work, promote their
work, license their work, and collect royalties for use of their work.
Therefore, large publishers and record companies control most of the
works and there is usually one CRO in each territory that licenses the
works. If these entities are reluctant to change, there is not much the
individual songwriters and performers can do. However, some of the
larger publishers and record companies have begun to embrace the online environment. For example, record companies and CROs that administer their rights in the sound recordings have digitized and licensed over
448.
449.
450.
451.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

452. Assessment, supra note 207, at 10 n. 19.

453. Id.
454. Id.
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one million tracks to various online music providers. 4 5 5 However, CROs
that administer rights in musical compositions have been reluctant to
adopt a similar business model, claiming the authors are best served
when CROs are in close proximity to the users, i.e. online music providers. 4 5 6 These CROs claim that proper administration of rights cannot be
4 57 It
accomplished at a distance, even with the use of digital technology.
seems clear, therefore, that there needs to be a multiterritorial licensing
regime set in place because the market will likely not produce effective
4 58
cross-border licensing on its own.

A.

THE E.U.:

WHERE THE NEXT MULTITERRITORIAL LICENSING

REGIME WILL BE DEVELOPED

The E.U. is the crucible in which to implement a multiterritorial license, either through legislation or by CROs fearing legislation. The
E.U. Commission has expressed its concerns regarding the present licensing practices of CROs. The Commission feels that it will be increasingly difficult to justify the licensing of online music on a national level
as digital technology develops, reducing the cost advantages that had
been the benefit of allowing CROs to manage rights on a territorial basis. 4 5 9 CROs need to license multiterritorially in order to again become

indispensable. 4 60 On May 18, 2005, the E.U. Commission issued a Recommendation on collective cross-border management of copyright and
related rights for legitimate online music services.4 6 1 A Recommendation
is a non-binding instrument that is often the first step in preparing legislation. 4 6 2 Commentators see the 2005 Recommendation as a first step in
46 3
the multiterritorial management of legitimate online music services.
The Commission recognized the need for multi-territorial licensing to increase the legal certainty for commercial users of musical works on the
Internet and to foster legitimate online services, which would increase
455. Id. at 25; see also Part VILE. supra (discussing other platforms created or joined by

publishers and record companies, allowing them to license their works multiterritorially or
globally).
456. Assessment, supra note 207, at 9.
457. Id.
458. Commission Study, supra note 226, at 23.
459. Assessment, supra note 207, at 11.
460. Id.
461. Report on the Commission Recommendation on Collective Cross-Border Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services, Eur. Parl.
Doc. A6/0053 19 (2007), available at http://www.//europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pub
Ref=//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2007-0053+OtOC+PDF+VO//EN [hereinafter Commission Recommendation].

462. Ltider, supra note 7, at 20.
463. Id. at 13-14.
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royalties for rights holders. 4 64
The E.U. Recommendation recognized that rights holders and users
465
should be able to choose any CRO they wish to manage their rights.
The Member State of residence or the nationality of either the rights
holder or the CRO will not have any bearing on which CRO the rights
holder may entrust its work. 4 6 6 In its subsequent Study, the Commission proposed three options in dealing with licensing of music in the digital environment, ultimately choosing "Option 3," which gave "rightholders the choice to authorise [sic] a collecting society of their choice to
manage their works across the entire EU" as the preferred option. 4 6 7 In
addition, the Recommendation stated that rights holders may determine
the territorial scope of the CRO's mandate to administer the rights holders' rights in a work. 4 68 The Recommendation set guidelines for the con469
duct that CROs and commercial users were to engage in.
However, the Recommendation failed to address the problem of territorial rights management. 4 70 Multiterritorial harmonization of rights
management is seen as "indispensable" in making the Internet a greater
source of income for rights holders. 47 1 Users and providers of online music desire multiterritorial licensing because the present state of diverging local laws hinders effective cross-border licensing. 47 2 Providers of
online music also see multiterritorial licensing as a means to facilitate
new online business models. 4 7 3 There has even been talk of creating a
Community copyright that would cover the E.U. and displace the national copyright laws and the territoriality problems that result.4 7 4 An
argument in favor of the Community copyright is that the current territory-by-territory licensing only benefits the collecting CROs who administer most of these "national" rights. 4 75 The E.U. Commission has also
noted that there needs to be competition between CROs to increase
"transparency, accountability, royalty distribution and quality of enforcement." 4 7 6 Rights holders should be able to know how their royalties
4 77
are collected and distributed.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.

Commission Recommendation, supra note 461, at 54 $ 8.
Id. at 3 $ 3.
Id.
Commission Study, supra note 226, at 5.
Commission Recommendation, supra note 461, at 3 3.
See id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 14 n. 55.
Id.
Commission Recommendation, supra note 461, at 15.
Id.
Community Initiative, supra note 6, at 32.
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In 2007, the European Parliament ("Parliament") issued a report on
the Commission's 2005 Recommendation in which the Parliament expressed a strong interest in adopting a directive, i.e. binding legislation,
that would regulate collective management of cross-border music services. 4 78 However, in this 2007 Report, the Parliament admonished the
Commission's Recommendation for various reasons. One reason was
that, in creating the Recommendation, the Commission "circumvented
the democratic process" by not consulting the Parliament or the E.U.
Council. Another reason was that the Parliament felt that some of the
provisions of the Recommendation would hurt national music repertoires
and cultural diversity. 4 7 9 Parliament asked the Commission
[t]o present as soon as possible - after consulting closely with interested
parties - a proposal for a flexible framework directive to be adopted by
Parliament and the Council in codecision with a view to regulating the
collective management of copyright and related rights as regards crossborder online music services, while taking account of the specificity of
the digital era and safeguarding European cultural diversity, small
stakeholders and local repertoires, on the basis of the principle of equal
treatment ....480
However, the Commission is not legally obligated to follow the Parliament's Report on the Commission's Recommendation. 48 1 The Commission alone has the right to initiate legislation and make
Recommendations under Article 211 of the Treaty Establishing the Eu48 2
ropean Union.
BUMA, the Dutch CRO and one of the smaller European CROs,
fears, as did the European Parliament, that the E.U.'s 2005 Recommendation will lead to an over-centralized market with the larger CROs and

478. Report on the Commission Recommendation on Collective Cross-Border Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services, Eur. Parl.
Doc. A6/0053 19 (2007), at 8 $ 1, available at, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2007-0053+0$OC+PDF+V0//EN [hereinafter Parliament Report].
479. Parliament Report, supra note 478, at 4-5.
480. Id. The Commission proposes legislation. The Parliament and European Council
amend the proposed legislation and then vote on the final proposal. See Chemicalspolicy.
org, What is the EU?, http://www.chemicalspolicy.org/whatistheeu.shtml (last visited May
2, 2008) (providing a short overview of the E.U. governance structure and legislative
process).
481. Email from Tobias McKenney, European Commission's Directorate General of Internal Market and Services (May 19, 2008, 10:55 a.m. EST) (on file with author).
482. Id.; see also Treaty Establishing the European Community, Article 211, available
at, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:033 1:EN:
PDF.
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the major commercial publishers displacing the smaller ones. 4 8 3 BUMA
48 4
claims that this will be detrimental to "cultural diversity" in Europe.
The E.U. Commission actually agreed with BUMA in a March 13, 2007
resolution. 48 5 BUMA is now lobbying to have the 2005 Recommendation
48 6
changed to note this concern.
Subsequent to the Recommendation, the Commission published a
"call for comments," which would be used to monitor commercial developments. 4 87 This monitoring allows policy makers to determine if there is
a need to adopt binding legislation with respect to multiterritorial licens-

ing of online music. 48 8 If there were such a need, the process would indi-

cate the type of rules that would be most suitable.
In its Monitoring Report, which is a summarization of its "Call for
Comments," the E.U. Commission noted that CROs were mixed as to
whether binding legislation regarding European-wide licensing was preferred to a non-legislative approach. 48 9 A majority of CROs are against
legislation in the areas of transparency and governance. 4 90 Publishers
were unanimous in wanting a non-legislative approach at this point to
allow E.U.-wide licensing models to develop. 4 9 1 Users would like to see
492
legislation, but do not agree as to the subject matter of the legislation.
Most Member States of the E.U. would like to see legislation. 4 93 However, some states fear that legislation is not appropriate because it would
494
be unable to keep pace with rapidly changing markets.
B.

ATTEMPTS AT MULTITERRITORIAL LICENSING

The Commission, in its Monitoring Report, noted that its Recommendation had caused an impact in the licensing marketplace, causing
495
new multiterritorial licensing regimes to be developed and proposed.

483. Billboard.biz, CROs Promote Pan-European Licensing, http://www.billboard.biz/

bbbiz/content-display/industry/e3i8302b5a754f42f186b0a136a7fe73f9c (last visited Apr.
25, 2008).
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. Luider, supra note 7, at 20 (citing European Commission Call for Comments of 17
January 2007, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/copyright/docs/management/monitoring-en.pdf [hereinafter Call for Comments]).
488. Assessment, supra note 207, at 20-21.
489. Commission Monitoring, supra note 288, at 4.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id. at 5.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Email from Tilman Luder, Head of the European Commission's Copyright Unit
(May 5, 2008, 3:00 p.m. EST).
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There has been recent activity among some of the European CROs as
they attempt to come up with a multiterritorial regime on their own
before the E.U. Commission proposes a Directive that would force them
to do something they may not wish to do. 4 9 6 For example, Belgium's
CRO, SABAM, 4 9 7 announced the creation of SOLEM, Soci~t6 pour
l'Octroi de Licences Europennes de Musisque (Society for the granting
of European Music Licenses), which is to be a "one-stop-shop" for the collection of multinational rights, and notably those relating to online exploitations. 4 98 SACEM, in France, has designed several technological
tools to facilitate the exchange of information regarding the exploitation
of works, with real-time access, by international record producers and
499
content providers.
Alliance Digital, started by MCPS-PRS 50 0 (the U.K.'s CRO) is a new
platform for offering E.U.-wide licenses for the repertoires of songs ad5 0 1 SACEM, SGAE 50 2
ministered by small and medium sized publishers.
(the Spanish CRO), and SIAE (the Italian CRO) have created a "onestop-shop," called ARMONIA or Joint Venture Alliance ("JVA"), for the
licensing of their repertoires online and with mobile uses. 50 3 The project
appears to be open to all CROs who may grant JVA an exclusive mandate
to manage their online rights. 50 4 GEMA, the German CRO and MCPSPRS, formed the Central European Licensing and Administration Service ("CELAS"). 50 5 Large music publishing and record companies have
also created a number of multiterritorial licensing platforms. 50 6 There
are also a number of other multiterritorial licensing initiatives that
stakeholders mentioned to the E.U. Commission, but which had not, at
50 7
the time of the Commission's Monitoring Report, been implemented.
The stakeholders told the E.U. Commission that they see three ob508
stacles to CROs setting up an E.U.-wide licensing regime themselves.
496. Billboard.biz, supra note 483.
497. Soci~te Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs
498. Billboard.biz, supra note 483. SABEM has stopped SOLEM's activities while it
waits for a European model of collective management that is supported by publishers and
CROs. Id.
499. Id.
500. Mechanical Copyright Protection Society - Performing Rights Society
501. Commission Monitoring, supra note 288, at 5. The Alliance will "offer a competitive rights management services that comprise quarterly distributions, low administration
charges, access to online databases of the repertoire, license databases and audit results,
distribution in accordance with high standards and full transparency." Id.
502. Sociedad General de Autores y Editores.
503. Commission Monitoring, supra note 288, at 6.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. See Commission Monitoring, supra note 288, at 6-7 (listing the other initiatives).
508. Id. at 7.
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First, CROs are heavily engaged in litigation against each other, which
impedes progress in setting up the above-mentioned multiterritorial licensing initiatives. 50 9 The reason for the litigation is disagreement
amongst the CROs about the preferred licensing model and one CRO
questioning another CRO's mandate to license its repertoire of songs on
an E.U.-wide basis. 5 10 The second obstacle is that each Member State
applies a withholding tax in all licensing arrangements that involve parties based in more that two territories. 5 1 1 The third obstacle is the iden512
tification of works.
X.

CONCLUSION

The E.U. Commission noted, when assessing the Santiago Agreement, that territorially restrictive licensing of music online "is not justified by technical reasons and is irreconcilable with the world-wide reach
of the Internet."5 13 It is not clear what new types of technology will be
developed to facilitate the distribution and enjoyment of music to the
masses or what types of new technology will be developed to allow rights
holders to better manage their rights in the digital environment. However, one thing is clear: the present licensing regime based on territorially restrictive reciprocal agreements has no place in the online licensing
of music. If this restrictive system if not replaced with a multiterritorial
licensing regime it will continue to inhibit new platforms for the distribution and selling of music online and will prevent rights holders from realizing the rewards that the online environment has to offer. The
traditional rights management of copyrighted music has remained territorial, based on national borders, whereas the digital age and the Internet has resulted in transmissions reaching across all borders. 5 1 4 The
current licensing system forces online music providers to obtain a license
for more than one territory in order to provide legal certainty and insurance against infringement suits and other legal uncertainties in territories that access their transmissions of music. 5 15 The territory-byterritory management of most copyrights and related rights hinders the
development of legitimate cross-border online music services and is an
5 16
inefficient way to obtain multi-repertoire licenses.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Commission Opens Proceedings into Collective Licensing of Music Copyrights for
Online Use, IP/04/586 (May 3, 2004), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/586.
514. Luder, supra note 7, at 18.
515. See Assessment, supra note 207, at 5.
516. Id. at 5.
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In addition to a multiterritorial licensing regime, a "unilicense" for
online rights would be ideal. Rights holders and CROs in the United
States have proposed legislation to create a statutory blanket license to
cover performance, reproduction, and distribution rights. 5 17 However,
nothing has come of it. In addition, perhaps someday there will be one,
or a few, entities administering one unilicense for the public performance
right, distribution, and reproduction right for music transmitted online.
This would eliminate some of the administrative fees deducted by a foreign CRO before sent to the domestic CRO for distribution. 5 18 However,
these proposals for a "unilicense" or one entity administering a
"unilicense" would be very hard to implement considering how large and
entrenched CROs, publishers, and record companies are with the way
things are conducted now. In addition, countries would likely be wary of
one entity controlling their national repertoire of songs, even if the entity
only licensed online rights.
CROs, however, could change their licensing practices now, but they
do not. When asked why, CRO representatives state that territorial licensing allows CROs to be close to rights holders, which allows for better
service. 5 19 However, if this is the sole reason for continuing territorially
restrictive licensing of online music, then there is absolutely no reason
why it should continue. CROs can better serve their rights holders by
issuing multiterritorial licenses, which would make it easier for new
platforms of music to develop. The present licensing regime hinders the
development of new platforms for providing music online. New providers
of music would need licenses to transmit or sell music, which would
mean more royalties for rights holders. In addition, the competition that
a multiterritorial licensing regime would cause between CROs would
benefit rights holders by making the CROs more efficient. Royalty payments would no longer depend on a system of territorially restrictive
agreements, but on the relationship between rights holders and the CRO
of their choice.
Rights holders could facilitate the licensing of their rights multiterritorially or even globally. However, large publishing and record companies hold the rights in most works and are slow to change on their own,
as most large entities tend to be. However, within the last year some of
these large publishers and record companies, through various platforms,
517. Glaser, supra note 180, at III.2.ii.; see also Music Licensing Reform: Hearing
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, 109th
Cong., at "Online Music Licensing Reform," (July 12, 2005) (containing the statement of
Irwin Z. Robinson, Chairman and CEO of Famous Music Publishing and Chairman of the
Board of the National Music Publishers' Association), available at, http://judiciary.senate.
gov/testimony.cfm?id=1566&wit id=4453 (describing their proposal for a "unilicense").
518. Lider, supra note 7, at 27.
519. Berenson Email, supra note 264.
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have begun to license their works multiterritorially and even globally. If
CROs are not willing to change, technological advances may allow larger
music publishers and record companies to administer the online rights
for their music themselves, without assistance from a CRO.
The main obstacle for the Santiago Agreement was the economic residence provision. Any future multiterritorial regime must allow users
whose residence is within one of the members of the licensing regime to
obtain a license from any one of the other member CROs. In addition,
any agreement will have to be transparent as to how royalties are calculated. This was also a main point that the E.U. Commission was seeking
clarification on from members of the Santiago Agreement. 5 20 It also
seems apparent that a tariff based on the destination principle, i.e. the
place of exploitation, must be implemented if such an agreement will be
52 1
accepted by CROs.
The Santiago Agreement and the E.U. Commission's studies, reports, Assessment, and Recommendation indicate that a multiterritorial
licensing regime must have certain characteristics. These characteristics are: (1) the ability of rights holders to choose any CRO within the
licensing regime to administer their rights online, i.e. no "economic residence" clause; (2) transparency requirement as to how royalties are calculated, collected, and distributed and what, specifically, makes up a
CRO's administrative costs; (3) the ability of rights holders to decide
which of their rights they want a CRO to administer and which rights
the rights holders would like to self-administer; and (4) a method for calculating rates that is based on the destination principle.
In addition to these four main characteristics that a multiterritorial
license must have, there are other points that may be added to satisfy
certain interest groups. For example, the European Broadcasting Union
("EBU") has expressed some concerns that it would like to see addressed
in the next attempt at multiterritorial licensing. 5 2 2 A multiterritorial
license must come with a guarantee, through the provision of a legal presumption, that the blanket license granted to online music providers
guarantees providers that the CRO has the right to administer the right
520. Id.
521. See Guibault, supra note 116, at 3 (noting how a tariff based on the destination
principle would be most desirable and suggesting that a tariff based on the destination
principle be an aggregate of the tariffs of the member CROs calculated, taking into account
either the advertising revenue or the intensity of use in each country when applying a
percentage of each respective country's national tariff to the aggregate tariff).
522. Initial EBU Comments on Commission Staff Working Document: Study on a Community Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyright, Aug. 19, 2005,
19.8.2005/MB/HR, at 2, available at, http://www.ebu.ch/CMSimages/en/leg-pp-crossborder
_collectivemanagment_190805_tcm6-40156.pdf.
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in every work covered by the license. 5 2 3 The EBU also wants express
legislation that the multiterritorial license would cover not only the initial transmission, but also every other relevant act that takes place
within the area of the license in order to complete the intended effects of
the intended act.5 2 4 In calculating royalties for a multiterritorial license,
the EBU would like to see that the entire audience of the online services
5 25
are taken into account.
The E.U. Commission's Monitoring Report on the Recommendation
showed that the Recommendation spurred attempts at multiterritorial
and global licensing by CROs, publishers, and record companies. 5 26 The
E.U. Commission will follow further developments and will repeat the
monitoring if needed. 52 7 If CROs in the E.U. do not continue their attempts to develop a multiterritorial licensing regime, they will soon be
forced to change their practices as the European Commission is in the
process of monitoring attempts at multiterritorial licensing to determine
whether it is necessary to propose a directive to legislate multiterritorial
licensing of online music.
Historically, CROs provided services to individual rights holders,
such as songwriters and publishers, that the individual rights holders
could not perform on their own. 528 It was not feasible for numerous
songwriters and publishers to license performance rights, for example, to
numerous users. 52 9 CROs have allowed for the efficient licensing of
rights, collection and distribution of royalties, and enforcement of rights
for individual rights holders of copyrights. 530 In effect, these organizations have facilitated the market between creators of works and the
users of works. 53 1 However, the viability of these organizations has been
called into question recently with the Internet and the myriad of new
uses and platforms for music distribution that the Internet, and digital
technology in general, provide. 5 32 As technology allows for increased
worldwide access to musical works, CROs must provide online music
providers with what they desire, which is increased efficiency 5 3 3 and
consumers with what they desire - variety and low cost, while providing
rights holders appropriate and efficient compensation. To do this, CROs
must implement new tracking technology to increase their efficiency in
523.
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tracking works and in collecting and distributing royalties to rights holders. Most importantly, however, CROs must work together with rights
holders to offer multiterritorial and global licenses for online music providers. In essence, CROs and other organizations must adapt to best realize their role - the facilitator of the market between authors and rights
holders of music and users and providers of music. 53 4 As long as territorial licensing is the method used to license online music, CROs will never
realize this role.
534. COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 88, at 18.
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